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WHAT IS A “RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION”? 
ZOË ROBINSON* 
Abstract: Change in the First Amendment landscape tends toward the in-
cremental, but the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion two terms ago in Ho-
sanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC—
holding that religious institutions enjoy a range of First Amendment pro-
tections that do not extend to other individuals or organizations—is better 
understood as a jurisprudential earthquake. And yet, it could be that the 
biggest aftershock has yet to be felt, with the Court leaving open the most 
important functional question that exists in scenarios where there will be 
constitutional winners and losers: what, or who, is a “religious institution” 
for First Amendment purposes? Although lower federal courts have begun 
to grapple with the question, no satisfactory approach exists. This Article 
proposes a framework for distinguishing between those institutions that 
fall within the scope of the religious institutions category and those that 
do not. The framework proposed proceeds from a purposive analysis that 
turns on which institutions will most often and most effectively use the 
newly identified and exclusive protections to benefit society as a whole. 
To this end, the framework favors institutions that have as their purpose: 
(1) protection of individual conscience; (2) protection of group rights; and 
(3) provision of desirable societal structures. 
INTRODUCTION 
What religious institutions have constitutional rights? This question has 
become increasingly important. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and School v. EEOC, decided in 2012, the Supreme Court held that 
religious institutions have an absolute constitutional right to fire ministers 
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without regard for employment discrimination laws.1 Undergirding the holding 
was, Chief Justice John Roberts stated, the general principle that the text of the 
Constitution gives “special solicitude” to the rights of religious organizations.2 
With this statement, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor fundamentally changed the 
framework of the First Amendment Religion Clauses. Prior to Hosanna-Tabor, 
all litigants could pursue one or both of two claims under the Religion Clauses: 
that the government had burdened their religious liberty in violation of the 
Free Exercise Clause; and/or that the government had violated the Establish-
ment Clause.3 What Hosanna-Tabor has added is an additional doctrinal path 
for litigants to follow. Unlike the generally applicable Religion Clauses, how-
ever, this new cause of action is exclusive and applicable only to “religious 
institutions.”4 
Commentators have waged war over the legitimacy of the Court’s new re-
ligious institutionalism.5 The idea that religious institutions are unique for First 
                                                                                                                           
 1 132 S. Ct. 694, 705–06 (2012) (adopting a ministerial exception, precluding the application of 
employment discrimination laws to “ministers” in religious institutions). 
 2 Id. at 706. 
 3 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses are contained within 
the First Amendment, which reads in pertinent part: “Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Id. Part I, Section B details the Court’s 
doctrinal approach to the First Amendment Religion Clauses. See infra notes 156–171 and accompa-
nying text. 
 4 See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706. Post-Hosanna-Tabor, if a litigant can show that it is a 
“religious institution,” it is entitled to a First Amendment right to absolute constitutional protection for 
any activity covered by the institutional right. See id.; Howard Wasserman, Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 
Adjudicative Jurisdiction, and the Ministerial Exception, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 289, 291–
95 (2012), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/160-U-Pa-L-Rev-PENNumbra-289.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8F8-U7FX. On the broad ramifications of Hosanna-Tabor, see, for example, Paul 
Horwitz, Act III of the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 973, 975–76 (2011); Christopher C. 
Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 63 (2011); Michael W. McConnell, 
Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821, 837 (2012) (concluding that it “may be 
the broader doctrinal implications of Hosanna-Tabor that have the most lasting significance”); Wasser-
man, supra, at 291; John Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty 42 (Wash. Univ. 
in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper, Working Paper No. 12-10-08, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2158861, archived at http://perma.cc/TKY6-8FYX. 
 5 On the normative question of religious institutions as constitutional rights holders, see PAUL 
HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 174–93 (2013); Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the 
Church, 4 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 59, 64 (2007) [hereinafter Garnett, The Freedom of the Church]; 
Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. 
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515, 531–32 (2007) [hereinafter Garnett, Religion and Group Rights); 
Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 253, 267–68 (2009) [here-
inafter Laycock, Church Autonomy]. See also Carl H. Esbeck, A Religious Organization’s Autonomy in 
Matters of Self-Governance: Hosanna-Tabor and the First Amendment, 13 ENGAGE 168, 172 (2012) 
(noting how Hosanna-Tabor could lead to abuse and may leave religion “unregulated and out of con-
trol”); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church 
Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter Laycock, Towards a General Theory] (asserting that “churches have a constitutionally protected 
interest in managing their own institutions free of government interference”); Victor M. Muñiz-
Fraticelli, The Distinctiveness of Religious Liberty 1–3 (McGill Univ., Working Paper, 2011), availa-
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Amendment purposes, claims one prominent scholar, is antithetical to the ide-
als of neutrality and equality that the Religion Clauses were intended to en-
shrine.6 However, while scholars focus on the normative validity of the Court’s 
new institutional right, the doctrinal contours remain largely unaddressed.7 
And of all of the potential doctrinal issues raised by the Court’s new religious 
institutionalism, one stands out as critically important: the threshold question 
of who, or what, is a “religious institution.”8 Answering this question is cru-
cial because it determines what institutions have the unique and rare absolute 
constitutional protection over a whole host of activities.9 
Myriad institutions have wasted no time in vying for the “religious insti-
tution” designation.10 Religiously-owned businesses, religious lobby groups, 
                                                                                                                           
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1921646, archived at http://perma.cc/
FQ6W-AFRH (arguing that the tradition of religious liberty is distinctive and includes church auton-
omy); Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church? 1 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. 
of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-061, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1911412, archived at http://perma.cc/7952-LRVS (citing the fallacy 
of past Religion Clause scholarship as being under the false belief that “the First Amendment’s reli-
gion clauses are about religion,” and arguing instead that “[t]hey are about the church”). Compare 
Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917, 
919–21 (2013) (arguing that religious institutions do not give rise to a special set of rights, autonomy, 
or sovereignty separate from individual rights of conscience), with Paul Horwitz, Defending (Reli-
gious) Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 1049, 1061–63 (2013) (offering a critique of Schragger and 
Scwartzman’s article refuting the special rights of religious institutions). 
 6 Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 920 (arguing that, historically, “the institutional 
church . . . has often been the enemy of toleration and of religious liberty”); see ANDREW KOPPEL-
MAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 95–96 (2013). 
 7 But see Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 839, 861–62 (2012) (outlining the potential implications of Hosanna-Tabor for tort and contract 
cases involving churches and ministers); Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic 
and Limits of Hosanna-Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 47), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2294766, archived at http://perma.cc/7YTC-8BEJ 
(explaining how fully protecting the specific institutional right in the employment discrimination 
context raises questions regarding the applicability of contracts, torts, and labor law principles to reli-
gious institutions). 
 8 See infra notes 68–128 and accompanying text (providing an overview of scholars’ limited 
attempts to define a “religious institution”). 
 9 See infra notes 138–141 and accompanying text (elaborating on this assertion). On the Court’s 
general unwillingness to recognize a constitutional right as absolute, see, for example, Milkovich v. 
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 3, 21 (1989) (refusing to extend absolute constitutional protections to 
matters of opinion); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963) (distinguishing the absolute 
constitutional protections provided against government regulation of religious beliefs from the limited 
constitutional protections for religiously motivated conduct); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 573 (1942) (denying “fighting words” absolute constitutional protection). 
 10 See generally Franciscan Univ. of Steubenville v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-CV-440, 2013 WL 
1189854 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2013); Roman Catholic Diocese v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 406 (N.D. 
Tex. 2013); Conlon v. Sebelius, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Archdiocese of St. Louis v. 
Sebelius, 920 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (E.D. Mo. 2013); Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Sebelius, 920 F. 
Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2013); Persico v. Sebelius, 919 F. Supp. 2d 622 (W.D. Pa. 2013); Univ. of Notre 
Dame v. Sebelius, No. 3:12CV253RLM, 2012 WL 6756332 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012); Catholic Dio-
cese of Biloxi, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12CV158–HSO–RHW, 2012 WL 6831407 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 20, 
184 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:181 
religious universities, and religious schools have all filed claims with the lower 
federal courts claiming to be First Amendment religious institutions.11 These 
institutions are claiming that they are constitutionally protected from adhering 
to, for example, Title VII discrimination laws,12 the Obama Administration’s 
health insurance mandate requiring employers to provide contraception,13 
workers compensation laws,14 and basic common law rules like negligence and 
contract.15 
The lower courts are struggling to figure out how to determine which of 
these institutions are “religious institutions” for the purposes of the new First 
Amendment right.16 Lacking any guidance or coherent theory as to how to sin-
                                                                                                                           
2012); Roman Catholic Archdiocese v. Sebelius, 907 F. Supp. 2d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Zubik v. Sebe-
lius, 911 F. Supp. 2d 314 (W.D. Pa. 2012); Roman Catholic Diocese v. Sebelius, No. 4:12-CV-00314 
(N.D. Tex. May 21, 2012) (West, Dockets); Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-
CV-00159 (N.D. Ind. May 21, 2012) (West, Dockets). For a discussion of the erosion of religious 
freedom in the United States, see generally AD HOC COMM. FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, U.S. CONFER-
ENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, OUR FIRST, MOST CHERISHED LIBERTY: A STATEMENT OF RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY (2012), available at http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/upload/Our-
First-Most-Cherished-Liberty-Apr12-6-12-12.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9ET6-DSWD. 
 11 See supra note 10 (collecting cases). 
 12 See, e.g., Cannata v. Catholic Diocese, 700 F.3d 169, 170 (5th Cir. 2012); Askew v. Trustees of 
Gen. Assembly of Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith Inc., 684 F.3d 413, 415 (3d 
Cir. 2012); Herzog v. St. Peter Lutheran Church, 884 F. Supp. 2d 668, 671–72 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 13 See generally Franciscan Univ. of Steubenville, 2013 WL 1189854; Roman Catholic Diocese, 
927 F. Supp. 2d 406; Conlon, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1126; Archdiocese of St. Louis, 920 F. Supp. 2d 1018; 
Roman Catholic Archbishop, 920 F. Supp. 2d 8; Univ. of Notre Dame, 2012 WL 6756332; Roman 
Catholic Archdiocese, 907 F. Supp. 2d 310; Roman Catholic Diocese, No. 4:12-CV-00314; Diocese of 
Fort Wayne-South Bend, No. 1:12-CV-00159. For information about the health insurance mandate, see 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
On the contraception mandate specifically, see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (Supp. V 2011) (requiring 
that any group health plan provide coverage to women for “preventative care and screenings” without 
any cost sharing, as provided for in the Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”) 
guidelines); Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventative 
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 29 
C.F.R. pt. 54). The HRSA guidelines define women’s preventative healthcare to include “[a]ll Food 
and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient educa-
tion and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.” Women’s Preventative Services Guide-
lines: Affordable Care Act Expands Prevention Coverage for Women’s Health and Well-Being, U.S. 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/, archived at http://
perma.cc/U2RX-JV7B (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). 
 14 See Big Sky Colony v. Mont. Dep’t of Labor and Indus., 291 P.3d 1231, 1235 (Mont. 2012) 
(arguing that the State of Montana has violated their institutional rights by forcing the community to 
provide workers compensation insurance to its members that work outside the community). 
 15 See, e.g., Lund, supra note 7, at 21–46 (outlining a series of lower court decisions where reli-
gious institutions claim constitutional protection from the application of contract and torts rules). 
 16 Compare Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 
82 U.S.L.W. 3139 (U.S. Nov. 26, 2013) (No. 13-354) (holding that the protections of the First 
Amendment extend to for-profit corporations), with Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3139 
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gle out this newly specialized constitutional group among a sea of organiza-
tions that increasingly claim to be religious, courts are vacillating between 
identifying First Amendment religious institutions based on who they are, what 
they are doing, how they go about it, or why they want to—without any clear 
theoretical justification for their choices.17 
Given the importance of this threshold question, it is surprising that there 
has yet to be any serious attempt to define a “religious institution” for First 
Amendment purposes. This Article fills this gap by presenting the first scholar-
ly attempt to offer a set of guidelines for courts to identify a First Amendment 
religious institution. It proceeds from the perspective of First Amendment ex-
ceptionalism—that only a certain subset of groups claiming to be religious in 
nature will qualify as a constitutional religious institution. The Article argues 
that the most pragmatic and definable way to sort first-order religious institu-
tions—i.e., those groups that should be classified as rights holders—from sec-
ond-order religious institutions—i.e., those groups that possess no broader 
rights than individual citizens—is to examine the Court’s justification for the 
existence of a First Amendment religious institution category and to subse-
quently identify the underlying values that support that justification.18 This 
purposive perspective uncovers three values that should undergird any frame-
work for categorizing religious institutions: (1) recognition of religious group 
rights and sovereignty; (2) promotion of individual freedom; and (3) provision 
of desirable democratic structures.19 From these values we can develop a set of 
pragmatic guidelines that courts can utilize to identify institutions that fulfill a 
unique and important role in our constitutional democracy.20 
This Article is organized as follows. Part I focuses on the question of 
identifying the holder of any given constitutional right.21 It examines the 
Court’s general approach to determining who (or what) holds a constitutional 
right in order to extract guidance on calibrating the guidelines for determining 
what is a constitutional religious institution. This Part also takes a more narrow 
focus and examines judicial, statutory, and scholarly attempts to define a “reli-
gious institution,” albeit typically in a limited statutory context. Part II pro-
vides a comprehensive overview of the Court’s new religious institutionalism 
jurisprudence, clarifying both the substance and structure of the Court’s new 
religious institutionalism, thereby laying the groundwork for identifying both 
the justifications for, and underlying values of, constitutional religious institu-
                                                                                                                           
(U.S. Nov. 26, 2013) (No. 13-356) (holding that “a for-profit, secular corporation cannot assert a claim 
under the Free Exercise Clause”). 
 17 See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1135; Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 384–85. 
 18 See infra notes 142–265 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 94–265 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 265–305 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 22–67 and accompanying text. 
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tionalism.22 Part III is the core of the Article.23 Part III argues that the most 
theoretically sound way to identify first-order religious institutions is to tease 
out the values that the Court seeks to protect by recognizing a discrete consti-
tutional right for religious institutions. By building a definition from the fun-
damental values encapsulated in the Court’s religious institutionalism deci-
sions, we are more likely to focus on protecting those religious institutions that 
fulfill a special constitutional role in our democracy. Relying on the three iden-
tified constitutional values of religious group rights, individual liberty, and 
democratic support, Part III concludes by offering a set of preliminary guide-
lines for lower courts to identify a first-order religious institution. These guide-
lines offer courts a constitutionally coherent and theoretically consistent means 
by which to identify first-order religious institutions and sort institutional 
claimants going forward. 
I. THE FORGOTTEN ANTECEDENT QUESTION: IDENTIFYING THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS-HOLDER 
The exceptional status that the Supreme Court has given to religious insti-
tutions presumes some kind of identity-based distinction among religious 
groups, at least as far as whether they are or are not a first-order religious insti-
tution. The problem, however, is figuring out how to make these constitutional 
distinctions between first- and second-order religious institutions. The defini-
tion is so challenging that it is even difficult to settle on the appropriate fram-
ing of the question: do we identify first-order religious institutions based on 
who they are, what they are doing, how they go about it, or why they want to? 
Fortunately, we do not start with a completely blank slate. In beginning to 
answer this definitional question, Section A of this Part examines how the 
Court has identified constitutional rights-holders in other constitutional con-
texts.24 Section B then looks at attempts by the lower federal courts to identify 
a “religious institution” in the statutory context.25 The purpose of this Part is to 
ascertain what each of these inquires contributes to the quest of identifying 
religious institutions for First Amendment purposes—that is, first-order reli-
gious institutions. 
A. Identifying Constitutional Rights Holders 
Americans have long debated who the Constitution applies to. Examples 
include slaves and ex-slaves, Native Americans, residents of U.S. territories, 
residents of U.S.-conquered island possessions, and immigrants or would-be 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See infra notes 68–141 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 142–305 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 26–46 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 47–67 and accompanying text. 
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immigrants.26 On its terms, the Constitution refers to a number of different cat-
egories of applicable persons, including a “natural born Citizen,”27 “Citizen” 
or “Citizens,”28 “the people” or “the People,”29 a “Person” or “Persons,”30 and 
specific persons, including “the accused” or “the Owner.”31 Although the Con-
stitution reserves a small selection of rights exclusively for citizens, by and 
large the Bill of Rights and the subsequent amendments make no mention of 
citizens, instead focusing on “persons” and “the people” in general terms. For 
the most part, then, the Supreme Court is not faced with the antecedent ques-
tion of who holds any given constitutional right, because “people” or “citi-
zens” more generally hold the right. 
Of course, there are exceptions to this. One need only reflect on the 
Court’s infamous 1856 Supreme Court decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford.32 In 
Dred Scott, the Court told us that African Americans were neither citizens nor 
persons, they were slaves and thus outside the protective auspices of the Con-
stitution.33 A more recent example is the Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission,34 where the Court held that at least for 
the purposes of the First Amendment Free Speech Clause, corporations are 
rights holders in the same way that individuals are rights holders.35 In Citizens 
United, a five justice majority specified that a key provision of the McCain-
Feingold Bipartisan Campaign Finance Act—which had placed limits on the 
amount of money that corporations and unions could spend on political cam-
paigns—was unconstitutional.36 The Court specified that corporations and un-
ions are simply associations of individuals, and as such, had the same First 
Amendment rights as individuals themselves.37 In the context of the legislation 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the 
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 17 (2002) 
(noting historically rooted questions regarding geographical limitations to, and the popular scope of, 
the Constitution’s application). See generally GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITU-
TION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996) (exploring the boundaries of the 
Constitution and the limits as to whom the Constitution applies). 
 27 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 28 See, e.g., id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; id. amend. XI; id. amend. 
XIV, § 1; id. amend. XIX; id. amend. XXIV, § 1; id. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
 29 Id. pmbl. (“[w]e the People”); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“the People”); id. amend. I (“right of the 
people”); id. amend. II (same); id. amend. IV (same); id. amend. IX (“the people”); id. amend. X 
(same); id. amend. XVII (same). 
 30 See, e.g., id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 31 See id. amend. III (“the owner”); id. amend. VI (“the accused”). 
 32 See 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856). 
 33 Id. (“We think [slaves and former slaves] . . . are not included, and were not intended to be 
included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution.”). 
 34 See 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 365. 
 37 See id. at 343. 
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in Citizens United, the ban on corporations and unions from providing cam-
paign finance was a limitation on the First Amendment speech rights of those 
associations.38 
Still, Citizens United presents a slightly different question than the one 
the Court is now facing post-Hosanna-Tabor. The Court in Citizens United 
was asked to determine whether a corporate entity is a “person” for constitu-
tional purposes.39 In so determining, the Court was assessing whether corpora-
tions could join a constitutionally inclusive category—i.e., the broad “insider” 
group comprised variously of “people,” “persons” and “citizens.” A similar 
assessment is being undertaken in the lower federal courts on the question of 
religious liberty rights for for-profit corporations. For example, in Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp. v. HHS, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
directly confronted the question of whether for-profit corporations could bring 
a claim pursuant to the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.40 In Cones-
toga Wood, the corporation did not seek to be classified as a first-order reli-
gious institution pursuant to Hosanna-Tabor. Instead, the corporation claimed 
rights under the generally applicable Religion Clauses and sought access to a 
right that is considered inclusive and broadly applicable.41 The Third Circuit 
held that even though Citizens United extended First Amendment protections 
to corporations, the “‘nature, history, and purpose’ of the Free Exercise 
Clause” does not support a corporate claim in the Religion Clause context.42 
Regardless of the correctness of the Third Circuit’s assessment in Conestoga 
Wood, the decision highlights the distinction between claimants seeking identi-
fication as a rights-holder for the purposes of an inclusive constitutional right, 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. (“The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other 
associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such associa-
tions are not ‘natural persons.’”). This question is distinguishable from Hosanna-Tabor, as it deals 
with the question of who, or what, is a rights holder in the context of an inclusive constitutional right, 
as opposed to an exclusive constitutional right. Compare Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705–06 (de-
scribing a First Amendment religious institution category with unique rights that are limited to reli-
gious institutions), with Citizens United, 558 U.S. passim (discussing whether corporations could join 
the broad, inclusive group of “people” or “persons”). Inclusive rights consist of those that are general-
ly applicable to all constitutional citizens. Cf. LESLIE C. GRIFFIN, LAW AND RELIGION 17 (2d ed. 
2010) (indicating that under both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, so long as litigants can 
show that their religion is burdened, the litigants hold the rights contained in the Religion Clauses). In 
contrast, exclusive rights, such as the right at issue in Hosanna-Tabor, are limited to certain entities. 
See 132 S. Ct. at 705–06. 
 40 724 F.3d at 381. The Supreme Court will review the case during the October 2013 term. Cones-
toga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
 41 Id. at 382–83. 
 42 Id. at 385; cf. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1135 (holding that the “First Amendment logic of 
Citizens United . . . where the Supreme Court has recognized a First Amendment right of for-profit 
corporations to express themselves for political purposes, applies” in the Religion Clauses context 
(citations omitted)). 
2014] What Is a "Religious Institution"? 189 
and those claimants seeking identification as a rights-holder for an exclusive 
constitutional right. In the context of the new religious institutionalism, it is the 
latter that is at issue, and the Court must determine membership into a consti-
tutionally exclusive category. 
There are very few exclusive rights in the Constitution. The most relevant 
example is the Press Clause in the First Amendment, which declares that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the Press.”43 
Unfortunately, the Press Clause yields limited guidance on how the Court de-
termines who holds a right for the purposes of an exclusive constitutional cate-
gory. The Court has consistently avoided making determinations as to who is 
“the press” for First Amendment purposes, commenting on the difficulty of the 
definitional task.44 For the Court, the identification of an exclusive category 
that warrants special constitutional protection “reeks of government favoritism 
toward a privileged few and discrimination against other, less favored speak-
ers.”45 The Court has expressed its concern with constitutional rights limited to 
specific groups. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, for example, commented that 
categorizing some speakers as “the press” would create a pecking order “remi-
niscent of the abhorred licensing system of Tudor and Stuart England—a sys-
tem the First Amendment was intended to ban from this country.”46 
It seems, then, that the Press Clause provides no guidance either. While 
we might be concerned that it is the exclusive nature of the Press Clause that 
has caused the Court to avoid addressing who or what is “the press” for First 
Amendment purposes, given the Court’s willingness to imply a categorical 
protection from the Religion Clauses, it appears that the Court is more willing 
to give meaning to the religious institutionalism category. Furthermore, where-
as the Press Clause has remained dormant, lower federal courts have been ac-
tively employing the religious institution category, making it unlikely that the 
Court will abruptly reverse gears and disengage from defining the rights holder 
because of the exclusive nature of the right. 
Identifying a “religious institution” therefore becomes of critical im-
portance. As daunting as this task might seem, we do not start from a blank 
                                                                                                                           
 43 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 44 Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1028–30 (2011). 
 45 Id. at 1029; see also Anthony Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
595, 627 (1979) (arguing that the Press Clause should not be interpreted as providing an exclusive 
right because the First Amendment was designed for the public and the press, “and freedom is indi-
visible”). But cf. David Lange, The Speech Clause and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REV. 77, 78–79 
(1975) (indicating that freedom of speech and freedom of press are separate rights, as argued by Jus-
tice Potter Stewart, and therefore the freedom of the press must be an exclusive right). 
 46 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 801 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring); see 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 n.40 (1972) (discussing the potential dangers of including 
“sham” newspapers within special institutional rights given to the press). 
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slate, and although limited, there are scholarly and statutory definitions of a 
“religious institution” that can guide the search for a constitutional definition. 
B. Other Attempts to Define a “Religious Institution” 
Despite the lack of precedential guidance in determining membership in 
an exclusive constitutional category, ascertaining how to identify a first-order 
religious institution is not impossible. Identifying “religions institutions” is 
something that is done all the time by legislatures and courts in non-constitu-
tional contexts.47 In addition, a small handful of scholars have attempted to 
define a “religious institution” for limited statutory purposes.48 These efforts 
not only demonstrate that definition is possible, but they also provide useful 
guidance on how to define religious institutions in the constitutional context. 
This Section looks at what these extra-constitutional attempts can contribute to 
a constitutional definition of first-order religious institutions. 
Legislative and scholarly attempts to define a religious institution are 
overwhelmingly functional, focusing on whether the organization is engaging 
in a religious activity.49 The appeal of this approach is obvious because it plays 
                                                                                                                           
 47 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C)(iv) (2006) (defining organizations for the purposes of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act as “associated with a church or a convention or association 
of churches” where the organization “shares common religious bonds and convictions with that 
church or convention or association of churches”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2006) (stating that Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not apply “to a religious corporation, association, educational 
institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform 
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or soci-
ety of its activities”); Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225–26 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(indicating that Methodist Healthcare is a religious institution in part because religious institutions are 
not limited to traditional organizations, but rather include other entities such as religious schools, 
corporations, and hospitals); Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 310 
(4th Cir. 2004) (concluding “that a religiously affiliated entity is a ‘religious institution’ for purposes 
of the ministerial exception whenever that entity’s mission is marked by clear or obvious religious 
characteristics”); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 362 (8th Cir. 
1991) (concluding that the defendant is a religious institution for the purposes of Title VII and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act). 
 48 Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimina-
tion by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1539–40 (1979); Michael A. Helfand, 
What Is a “Church”?: Implied Consent and the Contraception Mandate, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IS-
SUES 401, 402–11 (2013) (discussing religious employer exceptions to the Affordable Care Act); see 
also Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1 passim (2013) (asking spe-
cifically whether for-profit corporations are within the scope of the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act). 
 49 See, e.g., Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 310 (examining whether the “entity’s mission is marked by 
clear or obvious religious characteristics” for the purposes of the ministerial exception in Title VII); 
Altman v. Sterling Caterers, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (finding that the de-
fendant was not a religious institution in the context of the Fair Labor Standards Act because the de-
fendant acted like a for-profit restaurant in providing both kosher and non-kosher food); Report and 
Recommendations, Shukla v. Sharma, No. 07-CV-2972 (CBA) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2012), 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 90044, at *18–19 (holding that whether an organization is for-profit should not impact 
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on the sense that to be a “religious institution,” the organization is acting in 
some way that furthers religion as religion. 
Approaches to discerning whether an institution is a “religious institu-
tion” tend to be either objective or subjective, with the dominant approach be-
ing objective.50 An example of the narrowest objective functional approach is 
one scholar’s early attempt to establish a meaning of the term religious institu-
tion in the context of employment discrimination.51 The question “what is a 
religious institution,” according to this method, could be answered by identify-
ing the core religious attributes of institutions that claimed institutional status 
akin to that of a church.52 Under this approach, churches qua churches are con-
sidered the epicenter of any institutional category.53 Outside the epicenter, any 
actions moving an organization closer to the secular world meant the institu-
tion was subjecting “itself to secular regulation proportionate to the degree of 
secularity of its activities and relationships.”54 Thus, the more objective and 
identifiable the indicia of religiosity are, the more readily that institution could 
be analogized to a church. 
Many lower courts have followed a similar framework when interpreting 
the scope of “religious institutions” in a variety of statutory contexts.55 Of fun-
damental importance for nearly all courts has been the corporate structure of 
the institution,56 and courts have placed strong emphasis on whether the gov-
                                                                                                                           
whether it is considered religious in the context of the Fair Labor Standards Act); see also Shukla v. 
Sharma, No. 07-CV-2972 (CBA), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91051 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 29, 2009) (adopting 
the recommendations submitted by the Magistrate). 
 50 Helfand, supra note 48, at 408–10. Helfand describes the objective approach that most courts 
and scholars at least used to take as an attempt to “identify core religious attributes of institutions that 
claimed the status akin to that of a church.” Id. at 409. The reasoning behind this was that “the more 
objective and identifiable indications of religiosity were manifested by the institution, the more easily 
it could be analogized to a church for the purposes of the relevant legal inquiry.” Id. 
 51 See Bagni supra note 48, at 1539–40. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 1539. The epicenter is described as representing: 
the purely spiritual life of a church. The relationship between a church and its clergy 
and modes of worship and ritual surely fall within the spiritual epicenter, as do mem-
bership policies of a church. Religious education programs such as catechism, bible 
study, and Sunday school also fall within the epicenter. Similarly, church-operated or 
affiliated schools that teach secular subjects with a decidedly religious orientation might 
also fall within the epicenter. 
Id. 
 54 Id. at 1540. 
 55 Bagni, supra note 48, at 1533–39 (discussing a series of cases related to defining religious 
institutions with regard to federal employment discrimination laws). 
 56 See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1137 (noting that although the parties were for-profit cor-
porations, the corporations were closely held family businesses, were not publicly traded, and had 
missions that explicitly included Christian ideals); Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 384–85 (taking into 
consideration the fact that the institution was a nonprofit corporation); Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 
907 F. Supp. 2d at 316 (noting that the Archdiocese was a nonprofit organization that encompassed a 
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erning documents of the institution reference a religious mission, whether 
board members are required to be affiliated with any religion, and whether any 
house of worship retains any jurisdiction over the entity.57 Some courts have 
emphasized that an institution must be not-for-profit, specifying that for-profit 
entities are at odds with the pursuit of religious objectives.58 
Other courts have taken a more subjective approach to determining 
whether an institution functions as a “religious institution.”59 These courts em-
phasize the importance of religion in the day-to-day life of the institution. For 
example, the Fourth Circuit has stated that at the core of the definitional in-
quiry is whether the “entity’s mission is marked by clear or obvious religious 
characteristics.”60 For the Fourth Circuit, manifestations of religion in daily 
institutional life is an important element in determining whether an institution 
is a “religious institution.”61 
One notable recent attempt to define a religious institution moved away 
from a functional definition toward a definition that takes into consideration 
constitutional values.62 In the employment context, this new perspective sees 
functional approaches as beginning from the wrong starting point.63 Instead, 
this approach recommends determining an institution’s status from the per-
spective of the employee, and suggests that courts “ask whether the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the employment relationship were sufficient for the 
employee to recognize his or her employer as a religious employer.”64 
                                                                                                                           
large number of parishes within New York); Altman, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1385 (considering the restau-
rant’s for-profit incorporation). 
 57 Helfand, supra note 48, at 410; see, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1137 (describing the corpo-
rations’ missions as explicitly Christian); Hollins, 474 F.3d at 225–26; Scharon, 929 F.2d at 362 (not-
ing that “[t]he hospital’s Board of Directors consists of four church representatives” and that its “Arti-
cles of Association may be amended only with the approval of the Episcopal Diocese of Missouri of 
the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America and the local Presbytery of the Pres-
byterian Church (U.S.A.)”). 
 58 Altman, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1385; Report and Recommendations, supra note 49, at *18 (consid-
ering the plaintiff's claim that the ministerial exception was unavailing because defendant was a for-
profit corporation); Helfand, supra note 48, at 410 (observing that in debates regarding “the contra-
ception mandate, the government has consistently taken the position that institutions cease to function 
as religious employers . . . if the institution in question seeks to turn a profit”). 
 59 Hollins, 474 F.3d at 225–26 (considering the role that individuals play with regard to the organ-
ization in determining whether the ministerial exception applies); Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 310 (not-
ing that “the Hebrew Home maintained a rabbi on its staff, employed mashgichim to ensure compli-
ance with the Jewish dietary laws, and placed a mezuzah on every resident’s doorpost”). 
 60 Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 310; accord Hollins, 474 F.3d at 225–26 (illustrating that the Sixth 
Circuit has adopted a similar position). 
 61 Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 310. 
 62 See Helfand, supra note 48, at 409, 424–25. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 409. 
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This employee-focused perspective is based on the Court’s implicit ac-
ceptance of implied consent in its decisions involving church property.65 The 
claim is that the Court recognized that people join religious institutions in or-
der to achieve uniquely religious objectives, such as faith and salvation. Con-
sequently, in joining such an organization the members impliedly consent to 
any rules and regulations of that organization.66 Thus, an institution will only 
be designated a “religious institution” if the employees can be presumed to 
have impliedly consented to the authority of the institution in order to promote 
those objectives particularly unique to the religion.67 This approach, then, is 
more firmly rooted in the Constitution than any of the other approaches out-
lined in this Section. 
In considering what the Court is valuing in the church property cases, the 
implied consent approach moves the focus away from the functional criteria 
that has dominated the lower courts’ approach to religious institutionalism, and 
toward an approach that better accounts for constitutional values. Standing 
alone, however, this approach falls short of the goal of identifying those insti-
tutions that fulfill the constitutional function of religious institutions. That is, 
the lens is too narrowly focused and risks underinclusion. If we are to calibrate 
guidelines for the courts to use to ascertain which institutions are first order 
religious institutions, we need to broaden our approach. To this end, the next 
Part reviews the entirety of the Court’s religious institutionalism jurisprudence 
to provide the necessary grounding for elucidating the Court’s rationale for its 
unique valuing of religious institutions under the Constitution. 
II. RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONALISM IN THE SUPREME COURT 
This Part has three core goals. First, as noted above, this Part charts the 
trajectory of the Court’s First Amendment treatment of religious institutions. 
The Court’s treatment of First Amendment disputes involving religious institu-
tions has mostly followed a linear path. Both in church-property and church-
clergy disputes, the Court has consistently taken a hands-off approach, defer-
ring to the decisions made by the religious institution in question. In one sense, 
Hosanna-Tabor is more of the same; the Court refused to intervene in an em-
ployment decision made by a religious institution. But, as this Part outlines, the 
Court exceeded its typical hands-off approach in Hosanna-Tabor, suggesting 
that not only should courts treat the internal workings of constitutional reli-
                                                                                                                           
 65 Id.; see Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 
115 (1952) (citing Watson v. Jones as “radiating a spirit of freedom for religious organizations”); Wat-
son v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871) (indicating that those who choose to unite with a 
religious organization impliedly consent to the organization’s governance); infra notes 68–93 and 
accompanying text 
 66 Helfand, supra note 48, at 409. 
 67 Id. 
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gious institutions (i.e., first-order religious institutions) with deference, but 
also that first-order religious institutions possess special First Amendment 
rights not enjoyed by individual citizens or non-religious institutions (i.e., sec-
ond-order religious institutions). 
Second, foreshadowing the purposive approach this Article takes to defin-
ing first-order religious institutions in Part III, this Part has the goal of begin-
ning to tease out the principles that undergird these decisions, paying special 
attention to the continuity of these principles through the decision in Hosanna-
Tabor. This jurisprudential overview, then, provides the essential background 
for developing a workable framework for identifying first-order religious insti-
tutions in Part III. Finally, this Part concludes by providing the first clear over-
view of the new Religion Clauses by outlining the pre- and post-Hosanna-
Tabor litigation possibilities available to wronged religious claimants. 
A. The Rise of Religious Institutionalism in the Supreme Court 
This Section examines Hosanna-Tabor and the cases that predate it in or-
der to provide a picture of the basis on which the Court has recognized reli-
gious institutions as constitutionally distinct. This case analysis will form the 
basis for examining the underlying values of the special constitutional protec-
tion for religious institutions and the related preliminary framework for sorting 
institutions discussed in Part III. Because the case law has developed in a sub-
ject-matter context, I will examine the cases in these groupings. The first two 
Subsections illustrate the early deferential approach of the Court. The third 
Subsection details the more expansive approach that the Court followed in Ho-
sanna-Tabor. 
1. Religious Institutionalism and Church-Property Disputes 
The decision that is frequently referred to as the seminal religious institu-
tionalism case is the 1871 Supreme Court decision in Watson v. Jones.68 Wat-
son involved a dispute over control of church property, following a schism be-
tween two church factions over the issue of slavery. The anti-slavery faction 
had the support of the majority of the congregation and the national church, 
whereas the minority pro-slavery faction was comprised of the elders that gov-
erned the church, as well as a majority of the trustees who held the title to the 
property. Both factions filed claims in court claiming to be the true church and 
therefore entitled to use and control of the building.69 
                                                                                                                           
 68 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679. For an excellent overview and greater illumination of this decision and 
its importance, see Kurt T. Lash, Beyond Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447, 456–59 
(2009); Lund, supra note 4, at 12–15. 
 69 Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 685–700; see Lash, supra note 68, at 456–59; Lund, supra note 4, 
at 12–15. 
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In holding for the anti-slavery faction, the Supreme Court specified that it 
was required to respect the autonomy of the church.70 The Court said that 
courts were required to stay out of church disputes because churches had the 
right to govern themselves and resolve their own disputes.71 For the Court, this 
idea of church autonomy was traceable to the concept of “implied consent.”72 
The Court noted that religious associations are voluntary organizations, and 
when individuals join a church they impliedly consent to that church and to 
any overarching hierarchy that makes decisions with respect to matters of faith 
and governance.73 For the Court, it was unquestioned that voluntary religious 
associations had the right to form and facilitate the dissemination and expres-
sion of religious doctrine.74 Congregants can then either choose to stay in the 
church as they joined it, or they can choose to leave. In no way, the Court said, 
could the government be employed to force the church to change its govern-
ance, practices, or religious views.75 The implied consent of the congregants 
meant that the courts had an obligation to defer to the preexisting rules of con-
duct established by the church itself.76 
The Court explained that maximization of church autonomy meant that 
courts would be required to adopt a different approach to church schism cases 
depending on whether the church was hierarchical or congregational.77 Where 
the denomination in question has a hierarchical structure—i.e., the congrega-
tion accepted the authority of a larger church body—and the congregation was 
originally part of that hierarchy, the Court said that courts should defer to the 
decision of the hierarchical authorities as to who is entitled to the local church 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729. 
 71 Id. (“It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the 
decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of 
ecclesiastical cognizance.”). 
 72 Id. (“All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this govern-
ment, and are bound to submit to it.”). 
 73 Id. at 728–29. According to the Court: 
The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dis-
semination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controvert-
ed questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the 
individual members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is unques-
tioned. 
Id. 
 74 Id. at 729. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 614 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing the Watson rule 
as requiring courts to “give effect in all cases to the decisions of the church government agreed upon 
by the members before the dispute arose”). In Watson itself, this meant that the federal courts could 
not quarrel with the General Assembly’s conclusion that the anti-slavery side represented the true 
church and therefore was the true owner of the church property. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 734–35. 
 77 See Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 724–27. 
196 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:181 
property.78 Where the feuding denomination was congregational in nature—
i.e., there was no church authority higher than the individual congregation—
the Court would defer to the decision of the majority of the congregation 
members.79 On the facts in Watson, this meant that the Court deferred to the 
decision of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, and the anti-
slavery faction supported by the hierarchy had the right to the property.80 
Although not a constitutional decision, the Watson Court recognized that 
the principles contained therein were premised on entrenched views of the ap-
propriate relationship between church and state.81 The framework in Watson, 
as well as the underlying rationale of implied consent to autonomous institu-
tional behavior, was subsequently applied in numerous church-property dis-
putes,82 and was eventually constitutionalized by the Court in the 1952 case 
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North 
America.83 In Kedroff, the Court held that a New York state statute that permit-
ted a local congregation of the Russian Orthodox Church to split from the hier-
archy and keep the church property violated the First Amendment.84 The Court 
based its decision on Watson, stating that the principles underlying Watson 
“must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free 
exercise of religion against state interference.”85 The Court said that the Wat-
son principle “[r]adiates . . . a spirit of freedom for religious organizations” 
that is “part of the free exercise of religion.”86 Furthermore, the Court noted 
that religious institutions had a constitutional right “to decide for themselves, 
free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of 
                                                                                                                           
 78 Id. 726–27. 
 79 Id. at 724–25. 
 80 Id. at 733–34. 
 81 See id. at 727 (stating that the decision was “founded in a broad and sound view of the relations 
of church and state”); see also Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116 (holding that “[t]he [Watson] opinion radiates 
. . . a spirit of freedom for religious organizations” which ultimately must be considered “part of the 
free exercise of religion”). 
 82 See, e.g., Shepard v. Barkley, 247 U.S. 1, 2 (1918) (applying Watson’s principles regarding 
hierarchical churches to give disputed church property to the national Presbyterian church over the 
claims of a local Presbyterian congregation); Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 140 
(1872) (applying Watson’s principles regarding congregational churches to give disputed church prop-
erty to a faction representing the majority of the congregation). 
 83 See 344 U.S. at 120–21. 
 84 Id. at 116 . Kedroff’s holding was extended in a follow-up case involving the same parties still 
fighting over the same property. See Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960). 
Where Kedroff had held that New York could not transfer power from the international Russian Or-
thodox Church to local churches by state statute, Kreshik held that New York could also not transfer 
that power through courts utilizing common law principles. See id. (holding that Kedroff applies to 
state power exercised over a religious institution whether that power is legislative or judicial in na-
ture). 
 85 Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116. 
 86 Id. 
2014] What Is a "Religious Institution"? 197 
faith and doctrine.”87 For the Court, even where a property dispute results from 
church decisions based on church custom on ecclesiastical issues, the Court 
will give deference to the church’s decision in order to protect the Church’s 
right to freely exercise its religion.88 
In a series of decisions following Kedroff, the Court has applied this def-
erential approach consistently. In the 1969 decision Presbyterian Church v. 
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, for example, the 
Court held that courts have no role in adjudicating intra-church disputes.89 The 
Court reversed a lower court decision based on judicial interpretation of church 
doctrine.90 The Court stated that civil court decisions based on ecclesiastical 
doctrine violated constitutional norms of church-state separation and would 
ultimately undermine religious institutions.91 Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. 
specified that any attempt to make determinations of allocation of church 
property based on inquiries into and analysis of church doctrine would under-
mine the intended freedom for religious organizations enshrined in the First 
Amendment.92 
Collectively, Watson, Kedroff, and their progeny have been described as 
the Court’s “hands-off” approach to religious institutions, requiring the gov-
ernment to defer to the will of the institution rather than to apply often con-
flicting legislative or judicial principles to determine the outcome of property 
disputes.93 
                                                                                                                           
 87 Id.; Lund, supra note 4, at 15. 
 88 Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 120–21. 
 89 393 U.S. 440, 447, 449 (1969) (“[T]he civil courts [have] no role in determining ecclesiastical 
questions in the process of resolving property disputes . . . [or] underlying controversies over religious 
doctrine.”); Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We Talking 
About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 845 (2009) (stating that Presbyterian Church confirms the 
courts’ hands-off approach to ecclesiastical disputes); see 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 265 (2006). 
 90 Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 444. 
 91 Id. at 445–47 (observing that it is “wholly inconsistent with the American concept of the rela-
tionship between church and state to permit civil courts to determine ecclesiastical questions,” and 
that to permit the civil courts to assess and base decisions on the interpretation of church doctrine, 
would “lead to the total subversion of . . . religious bodies”). 
 92 Id. at 448 (quoting Kedroff, 455 U.S. at 116). 
 93 Lund, supra note 4, at 16; see Garnett, supra note 89, at 845 (describing the “cluster of [church 
autonomy] cases that seem to illustrate and confirm the hands-off rule”); Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! 
Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1847 (1998) 
(describing Watson as “the origin of a ‘hands-off’ approach”); see also Joanne C. Brant, “Our Shield 
Belongs to the Lord”: Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right to Discrimination, 21 HASTING 
CONST. L.Q. 275, 299–300 (1994) (“[T]he Court’s early church property decisions indicate that courts 
should not attempt to resolve ‘internal’ church disputes.”); William Johnson Everett, Ecclesial Free-
dom and Federal Order: Reflections on the Pacific Homes Case, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 371, 382 (1996) 
(“A long series of legal precedents ha[s] confirmed that civil courts cannot interfere in internal church 
disputes . . . .”). Note, however, that in some instances, the hands-off doctrine might require the courts 
to intervene. See, e.g., Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 (applying a “neutral principles of law” approach to a 
church property dispute where it was necessary for the Court to interfere and where permitted by the 
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2. Religious Institutionalism and Clergy Disputes 
Although most of the Court’s decisions involving inter-institutional dis-
putes have involved church property, there have been a handful of cases in-
volving disputes over the appointment, retention, and removal of clergy.94 
These cases center on an individual’s claim regarding their right to act as a re-
ligious leader for a specific congregation.95 In these cases, as in the context of 
church property disputes, the Court has stated that it will defer to the will of 
the church, as it predated the dispute.96 
The earliest case involving a clergy dispute to reach the Court was Gon-
zalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, decided in 1929.97 Gonzalez involved a 
claim to an endowed chaplaincy, created in a will in the early 1800s. The en-
dowment specified that the chaplaincy was to be filled by descendants of the 
founder where possible.98 Raul Gonzalez, a fourteen-year-old boy and de-
scendant of the founder, claimed a right to the chaplaincy upon the death of his 
father. The Archbishop of Manila objected and refused to appoint Gonzalez to 
the position, specifying that the Catholic Church required all chaplains to be 
priests and have undergone seminary training.99 Gonzales objected to these 
grounds for refusing his appointment, claiming that when the chaplaincy was 
endowed these requirements for employment did not exist.100 The Court reject-
ed Gonzales’s claim, holding that determinations regarding both the qualifica-
tions of chaplains and whether a candidate meets those qualifications are ec-
clesiastical decisions to be made by church authorities.101 
The Court was more direct in its determination and reasons in the 1976 
decision of Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich.102 Milivojevich 
was serving as the presiding bishop for the American-Canadian diocese of the 
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church in America when the governing hierarchy, 
based in Yugoslavia, deposed him and chose to appoint someone else.103 Mili-
vojevich objected to his removal, claiming that it was invalid under church 
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 95 See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 697–98; Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 10. 
 96 See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 724–25; Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16. 
 97 See 280 U.S. at 10. 
 98 Id. at 12. 
 99 Id. at 12–14. 
 100 Id. at 14. 
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doctrine and filed suit to stop the removal.104 The case not only involved a dis-
pute over the right of a hierarchical church to appoint and remove clergy at 
their will; any determination of who was the rightful bishop of the church 
would resolve the question of who held the lucrative legal title for all of the 
church property in the United States.105 
The Court held that the secular courts were required to accept the deci-
sions of the governing body of a hierarchical church; which in this case meant 
that the decision of the hierarchical authority in Yugoslavia was final.106 Ac-
cording to the Court, the principle outlined in the church property case of Wat-
son applied with “equal force to church disputes over church polity and church 
administration.”107 The Court explained that religious institutions are the only 
institutions that could decide issues regarding church discipline and employ-
ment within the religious hierarchy because these issues “are at the core of ec-
clesiastical concern.”108 
3. Employment Decisions Beyond Clergy: The Ministerial Exception and 
Hosanna-Tabor 
Perhaps the most contentious of the subject-matter categories involving 
the recognition of institutional rights involves the right of a religious institution 
to employ, retain, and retrench employees based on principles of faith—even 
where those principles contradict generally applicable laws. Although the issue 
dominated the lower federal courts following the 1964 enactment of the Civil 
Rights Act, the Supreme Court studiously avoided the issue until 2012.109 The 
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Court came close to facing a similar issue in the 1979 case, NLRB v. Catholic 
Bishop.110 There, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) claimed ju-
risdiction over parochial Catholic schools in Chicago, Illinois, and South Bend, 
Indiana.111 The NLRB claimed that there had been unfair labor practices occur-
ring in the schools, ordered union elections, and subsequently declared a labor 
violation when the Catholic Church refused to bargain with the newly elected 
union representatives.112 The Catholic Church claimed that it had a constitu-
tional right to be exempt from NLRB jurisdiction, and that the National Labor 
Relation Act’s (“NLRA”) attempt to exercise authority over the Church 
schools undermined Church control over both the school and its teachers.113 
The Supreme Court specified that whether the NLRA was applicable to 
the Catholic Church and its subsidiary schools and employees raised “difficult 
and sensitive questions arising out of the guarantees of the First Amendment 
Religion Clauses.”114 Both the Act and the NLRB’s exercise of authority, the 
Court recognized, imposed on the “freedom of church authorities to shape and 
direct teaching in accord with the requirement of their religion.”115 The Court, 
however, avoided this constitutional question, holding that there was no evi-
dence that the NLRA was intended to apply to religious schools.116 
The issue of faith-based hiring practices culminated with the 2012 Su-
preme Court decision of Hosanna-Tabor.117 The facts of Hosanna-Tabor are 
well-known by now, but warrant a brief rendition here. The case involved an 
elementary school teacher, Cheryl Perich, who was employed as a “called 
teacher” —someone voted as such by the congregation after satisfying congre-
gationally specified, doctrinally-based academic requirements—at the Hosan-
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na-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School, a K–8 school in Redford, 
Michigan.118 Perich performed her duties as a called teacher for five years be-
fore becoming ill prior to the commencement of the 2004–2005 school year, 
which forced her to take disability leave.119 Part way through the school year, 
Perich received a doctor’s note that stated she was medically cleared to return 
to work and asked the school to return to the classroom. The school stated that 
a substitute had been hired through the end of the school year and that they 
doubted Perich’s ability to return to the classroom given the nature of her ill-
ness.120 After a meeting of the congregation, Perich was offered a “peaceful 
release” from her call, which Perich refused and threatened to file a claim with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).121 Perich was fired 
and filed a disability discrimination claim with the EEOC, and Hosanna-Tabor 
responded by claiming that the suit was barred by the First Amendment Reli-
gion Clauses’ “ministerial exception.”122 This exception—previously recog-
nized by the lower courts—prohibits any state interference with the employ-
ment relationship between a first-order religious group and one of its ministers. 
The Court agreed with Hosanna-Tabor and declared that the First 
Amendment Religion Clauses, working together, “bar the government from 
interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.”123 
The Court specified that were the Americans with Disabilities Act or any other 
employment laws to apply to a first-order religious institution, the state would 
be unconstitutionally interfering with internal church workings—a violation of 
that groups’ religious liberty.124 For the Court, at the core of the liberty protect-
ed by both of the First Amendment Religion Clauses is the ability of a first-
order religious group to “shape its own faith and mission.”125 Internal church 
decisions that “affect the faith and mission of the church itself” are so funda-
mental to the concept of religious liberty enshrined in the First Amendment 
that the Court held that the ministerial exception was not limited to internal 
decisions based on religious grounds.126 Scholarly expositions of the Hosanna-
Tabor decision are still developing. Nevertheless, law and religion scholars 
seem to agree that this decision “recognizes the constitutional liberty of reli-
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gious organizations to manage their institutions and limit the reach of secular 
or civil authority into their internal workings.”127 
* * * 
Taken together, the hands-off approach enshrined in the Court’s church-
property, clergy, and institutional-employment decisions constitutionalize a 
principle of institutional separation, whereby the institutions of church and 
state are to be separate and distinct.128 Hosanna-Tabor, however, also fore-
shadowed a new understanding of religious institutions as special rights hold-
ers. Still, the decision did not delve into which organizations would be deemed 
first-order religious institutions. The importance of this question is evident 
once we consider the shift that the new religious institutionalism has caused in 
Religion Clause doctrine. 
B. The New Religion Clauses 
It is clear that Hosanna-Tabor ushered in a new doctrinal structure under 
the Religion Clauses. Prior to Hosanna-Tabor, litigants could claim that the gov-
ernment had violated either or both the Free Exercise Clause or the Establish-
ment Clause. Pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause, litigants can claim that the 
government has burdened their religious liberty in one of two ways. First, a liti-
gant can claim that the government has burdened their religious belief.129 If the 
government burdens religious belief, then the litigant receives absolute constitu-
tional protection and no judicial balancing occurs.130 Second, a litigant can claim 
that the government burdened their religious action.131 The Court’s decisions on 
religious action indicate that religious action can be burdened either by a dis-
criminatory law or a non-discriminatory law.132 The distinction matters for liti-
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gants because if the burden on the litigant’s religious action is via a discriminato-
ry law, then the protection afforded that covered action is high—strict scruti-
ny.133 Conversely, if the burden on the litigant’s religious action results from a 
non-discriminatory law (i.e., a generally applicable law), then there is no protec-
tion afforded that religious action absent a showing of a hybrid claim, or an indi-
vidualized administrative determination (e.g., employment discrimination).134 
Litigants can also bring a claim pursuant to the Establishment Clause, 
claiming either that the government is favoring one religious sect over anoth-
er,135 or that the government is benefiting one religion by, for example, requir-
ing or permitting prayer in public schools or permitting religious symbols in 
the public square.136 Under both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, 
so long as litigants can show that their religion is burdened, the rights con-
tained in the Religion Clauses are applicable to them.137 The Religion Clauses, 
then, can be considered generally applicable—inclusive and applicable to all 
constitutional citizens. 
What Hosanna-Tabor has added to the Religion Clauses is an additional 
doctrinal path for litigants to follow. However, unlike the generally applicable 
Religion Clauses, Hosanna-Tabor’s institutional category is exclusive, and 
applicable only to “religious institutions.”138 This means that if the litigant can 
claim to be a “religious institution” for First Amendment purposes—that is, a 
first-order religious institution—then to the extent of the coverage of the insti-
tutional right the institution is afforded absolute constitutional protection. Im-
portantly, what this does not mean is that the religious liberty of first-order re-
ligious institutions is protected only to the extent of the coverage of the institu-
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tional right. Instead, to the extent that the institutional litigant claims protection 
from government intrusion on religious action that falls outside the scope of 
the institutional category, the action may well be protected by the generally 
applicable Religion Clauses. Similarly, a second-order religious institution—
that is, an institution not meeting the criteria for classification as a first-order 
religious institution—is not without constitutional protection. Instead, the sec-
ond-order religious institution can avail itself of the various Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clause protections that are available to all litigants who can 
demonstrate that their religion has been burdened.139 
The institutional category enshrined by Hosanna-Tabor is, then, a power-
ful extension of the previously settled Religion Clause doctrine.140 It adds a 
tiered structure to the Religion Clauses that was absent before the Court’s pro-
nouncement. The post-Hosanna-Tabor Religion Clauses can best be under-
stood as a two-tiered regime, whereby institutional litigants are best advised to 
claim that they are first-order religious institutions and thus entitled to the pro-
tective auspices of the exclusive category. If this claim fails—either because 
the subject-matter does not fall within the coverage of the right or because the 
litigant does not meet the criteria to be classified as a first-order religious insti-
tution—then that litigant can fall back to the inclusive, generally applicable 
Religion Clause doctrine.141 The fundamental importance of being classified as 
a first-order religious institution, then, cannot be overstated. For an institution-
al claimant, being identified as a first-order religious institution means absolute 
constitutional protection for any activity covered by the institutional right. As 
this Article stated at the outset, it is imperative to develop a workable frame-
work for identifying first-order religious institutions. The following Part estab-
lishes a framework to answer the question of how courts can determine wheth-
er an institutional claimant is a “religious institution” for First Amendment 
purposes. 
III. TOWARD A WORKABLE FRAMEWORK FOR IDENTIFYING  
“RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS” 
Although most of us would readily identify a local house of worship as a 
“religious institution,” the question becomes more complicated as we pan out 
from the core. For example, many local houses of worship belong to hierar-
chical organizations that mandate conduct and direct belief.142 It may be un-
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controversial that these organizations are also religious institutions, but what 
about the independent organizations funded and managed by the hierarchical 
organization, such as Catholic hospitals or for-profit businesses established by 
the hierarchy to supplement church income? There are also various educational 
institutions, both K–12 and university-level, that identify as religious. These 
organizations also vary in structure, with some institutions being established, 
maintained, and managed by churches or church hierarchies, whereas others 
are independent of any management structure and instead govern themselves. 
Then there are a slew of for-profit businesses that claim to be religious organi-
zations.143 Which of these institutions is a first-order religious institution? Are 
they all first-order religious institutions, able to organize at least some of their 
affairs independent of state regulation? Are only some of them? 
As noted earlier, this Article advances the principle of exceptionalism—
that there exist certain religious institutions that fulfill a unique and important 
role in our democracy.144 First-order religious institutions comprise a limited 
group of institutions that share common attributes and ultimately fulfill unique 
constitutional functions of religion qua religion. The most theoretically sound 
approach to identifying first-order religious institutions is to examine the Su-
preme Court’s decisions in its limited religious institutionalism jurisprudence. 
By examining these decisions, we can tease out the values the Court seeks to 
protect by recognizing discrete constitutional rights for an isolated category of 
actor. Indeed, by building a definition from the fundamental values encapsulat-
ed in the Court’s religious institutionalism decisions, we are more likely to fo-
cus in on identifying the unique functions of the religious institution is as op-
posed to the religious individual or other associational forms. That is, the 
search for a definition via values puts the emphasis on what the Constitution is 
protecting when it protects religious institution qua religious institution. 
This is not a novel approach. Sonja West has proposed a similar value-
based definition in a recent discussion of the search for a definition of “the 
press” for the purposes of the First Amendment Press Clause.145 Similarly, in 
the context of universities under the First Amendment, Paul Horwitz has ar-
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gued for a definition based on constitutional values.146 Most relevantly, in the 
context of generalized religious rights under the Religion Clauses, a host of 
scholars and judges have presented frameworks for determining the scope of 
protection based on the underlying values of the clauses.147 Following this ap-
proach, Section A of this Part will identify those values that underlie private 
ordering rights of religious institutions, and thus the Court’s new religious in-
stitutionalism. 
A. The Unique Constitutional Functions of Religious Institutions 
The institutions that we ultimately seek to categorize as first-order reli-
gious institutions are those institutions that fulfill the unique constitutional 
functions of religion qua religion. As a general matter, it is undisputed that the 
Religion Clauses broadly protect religious belief, expression, and action.148 
The value of religious institutions, then, focuses us in on the medium of insti-
tutional religion.149 
Religion is rarely an individual endeavor. Instead, people come together, 
bound in collective belief, worship, and related action. Valuing this group for-
mation and collective action in religious affairs, the text, history, and Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Religion Clauses all recognize the necessity of 
cleaving religious institutions from religious individuals.150 In valuing reli-
gious institutions, moreover, the Court recognizes that faith and spiritual rela-
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tionships are more than simply aggregates of individuals.151 Instead, the consti-
tutional recognition of religious institutions is an acknowledgement that the 
First Amendment includes two clauses that give “special solicitude to the 
rights of religious organizations.”152 
In carving out and recognizing religious institutions as a distinct category 
under the First Amendment, the Court is acknowledging the distinct private 
sphere of operation of religious institutions. This institutional recognition is an 
anomaly in First Amendment jurisprudence. Typically, the Supreme Court has 
adopted categories that are almost always subject-based, and its doctrine has 
been referred to as “institutionally blind.”153 The Court’s first inclination has 
generally been to view First Amendment claims through the lens of “juridical 
categories,” in which all rights-claimants are collected together and then sorted 
into categories based on the subject-specific facts of the claim.154 The institu-
tional blindness of the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is especially 
apparent in the Speech Clause under the doctrine of content neutrality.155 Un-
der the Speech Clause, the primary sorting principle is the content of the 
speech; the institutional identity of the speaker—be it the internet, telephone, 
books, magazines, or movies—is irrelevant.156 In other words, it is the speech 
rather than the speaker that matters, thus rendering relevant institutional dis-
tinctions between the speakers meaningless for First Amendment analysis.157 
Similarly, the Court has remained unwilling to recognize “the press” as an 
identifiable and legitimate sorting category, despite a clear textual basis for 
doing so.158 
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Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 79, 85 (2009) (discussing institutional blindness and institutional categories in First 
Amendment jurisprudence); Frederick Schauer, Prediction and Particularity, 78 B.U. L. REV. 773, 
781–85 (1998) (discussing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and categorical approaches to Supreme Court 
jurisprudence). 
 155 See Schauer, supra note 153, at 1754–55. 
 156 Id. at 1755. 
 157 Id. 
 158 See Horwitz, supra note 154, at 85; West, supra note 44, at 1070 (“Despite an explicit textual 
directive, the Press Clause has been interpreted to mean nothing more than the freedom to publish or 
disseminate individual speech—a right that is of dubious value considering that the Speech Clause 
protects these same freedoms.”). 
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Despite this trend, as Part I outlined the Court has consistently recognized 
that there is a difference between religious institutional claimants and other 
claimants in a small number of specific contexts.159 The Court’s religious insti-
tutionalism jurisprudence makes it clear that the Court perceives religious in-
stitutions as constitutionally distinct.160 This Section refers to the Court’s insti-
tutional jurisprudence and draws out those values undergirding the Court’s 
recognition of special First Amendment protection for religious institutions, 
namely: (1) protection of religious sovereignty; (2) promotion of individual 
freedom; and (3) provision of desirable structures. 
1. Protection of Religious Sovereignty 
The Court’s religious institutionalism decisions emphasize the importance 
of religious sovereignty.161 In this context, religious sovereignty presupposes 
that religious institutions are primary sovereigns, at least with respect to mat-
ters of internal governance and faith.162 To put it another way, the Court as-
sumes religious institutions are independent private governments (at least for 
some purposes), with a related right of private ordering.163 Generally speaking, 
the term “private government” refers to a private group that possesses a legal 
structure and an organizational decision-making process by which members, 
officers, and agents pursue common goals of the organization.164 These private 
organizations are “governments” because they “govern” some part of society, 
                                                                                                                           
 159 See supra notes 24–67 and accompanying text; infra notes 160–265 and accompanying text. 
 160 See supra notes 148–159 and accompanying text. 
 161 See infra notes 162–196 and accompanying text. 
 162 See infra notes 197–235 and accompanying text (discussing how promoting individual free-
dom is a constitutional value underlying the Religion Clauses). 
 163 See infra notes 236–265 and accompanying text (discussing how providing desirable struc-
tures that facilitate social engagement and protect the state from religious involvement are constitu-
tional values that underlie the Religion Clauses). “Private ordering” refers to a form of private law 
making in which private parties voluntarily regulate themselves through self-created rules and proce-
dures. Annette Burkeen, Private Ordering and Institutional Choice: Defining the Role of Multination-
al Corporations in Promoting Global Labor Standards, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 205, 207 
(2007); Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating 
a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 376 (2005). 
 164 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 144, 148–50 (2003) (identifying and defining private governments); Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making 
by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 202–03 (1937) (discussing the trend of private groups seek-
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ernmental power, see Harold I. Abramson, The Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators 
and Their Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 169–74 (1989) (analyzing categories of 
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ernment and private actors); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 543, 551–56 (2000) (conceiving of governance as a set of negotiated relationships between pri-
vate and public actors); David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 
647, 694–95 (1986) (outlining a proposal for a due process analysis of private delegations of public 
power). 
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and because they control resources, they have the power to influence through 
the grant or withholding of those resources.165 Of course, the public/private 
distinction is not infallible, but the term is useful in denoting a category of or-
ganizations that exercise power in a specified dominion. In other words, the 
concept of private government recognizes that some institutions are uniquely 
autonomous and hold exclusive jurisdiction—i.e., sovereign rights of private 
ordering—over certain affairs within that institution.166 
The term “private government” and the related right of private ordering is 
an apt descriptor of much of American law and society. For example, consider 
for-profit corporations, political advocacy groups, charitable trusts, trade un-
ions, and households and families.167 These organizations are “governments” 
in the sense that they govern some part of society, and within their private 
sphere, their “rule” is, at least to some degree, sovereign.168 Moreover, they 
can recourse to the public government—local, state, or federal—to enforce 
their regulations, orders, and decisions.169 Indeed, a significant amount of U.S. 
law has been fought about the scope of the right of private ordering of these 
private governments, and where the boundary of the private sphere ends and 
the sphere of the state begins.170 
                                                                                                                           
 165 Hills, supra note 164, at 148–50. 
 166 See id. at 149–52. Note that in his characterization of the rights of religious institutions, Paul 
Horwitz uses the term “sphere sovereignty.” Horwitz, supra note 154, at 83. Horwitz derives this term 
from a unique and very specific reference, the Calvanist theorist Abraham Kuyper. Id. Despite the 
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to describe an institution that has a specified sphere of authority to the exclusion of all other entities. 
Id. at 94. 
 167 Roderick Hills notes that households and families are more controversial concepts in this con-
text because, for example, what counts as a family is often contested. Hills, supra note 164, at 149; 
see, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Oh., 431 U.S. 494, 504–06 (1977) (indicating that the idea of 
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cate power to the familial entity as such). 
 168 Hills, supra note 164, at 149–50. 
 169 Id. at 150. 
 170 See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (holding that a statute limiting the state’s 
ability to release drivers’ information without their consent is constitutional); Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530 (1985) (addressing whether the Commerce Clause empowers 
Congress to enforce fair labor practices in areas of traditional government functions). The law has 
similarly struggled with the issue of distinguishing between the proper spheres of federal and state 
governance. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997) (addressing the constitutional-
ity of the Brady Act, which required state and local law enforcement officers to enforce a federal in-
stant background check system for firearms purchasers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
149 (1992) (considering the constitutionality of a federal radioactive waste disposal policy imposed on 
state regulators). 
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The public/private distinction and the constitutional recognition of family 
sovereignty in certain spheres—for example the right to educate one’s child as 
one chooses171—is just one example of the battle over the beginning and end 
of the private government and force of private ordering, and the beginning of 
the public sphere of sovereignty. Although all of the institutional settings have 
limits within their sphere of activity—e.g., the federal government and state 
governments cannot intrude on individual liberties contained in the Bill of 
Rights, and parents must meet minimum standards for the care and education 
of their children—each institution is recognized as uniquely “jurisgenerative” 
within its own sphere, a distinct “paedic nomoi” that functions autonomously 
“within the broader imperial nomos.”172 Undergirding all of these constitution-
al choices about dominion in specific institutional settings is the fundamental 
principle that the people, as sovereigns, made these delineating institutional 
choices, and choose to continue to value them.173 
A similar choice was arguably made with respect to religious institutions. 
For the Court, the people, both past—through the text and history of the First 
Amendment—and present—through the perpetuation of this special constitu-
tional solicitude—have chosen to encapsulate special authority over matters of 
faith, doctrine, and whatever else, within religious institutions.174 Although it is 
possible to resist the marking of religious institutions as worthy of special con-
stitutional value over and above other associational forms (e.g., the Boy 
Scouts) as a normative claim, as a descriptive matter it seems difficult to resist 
this recognition of religious institutions as unique private governments.175 
                                                                                                                           
 171 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 
534–36 (1925). 
 172 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304–05 (1993) (prescribing minimum standards for par-
ents); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–48 (1968) (circumscribing the power of the state); 
Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
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model in which “norms are universal and enforced by institutions.” Id. at 13. 
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the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 91 (1953) (“[G]overnment must recognize that it is not the 
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 174 See Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 
1274 (2005) (stating that “a certain number of existing social institutions . . . serve functions that the 
First Amendment deems especially important”). 
 175 See Garnett, Religion and Group Rights, supra note 5, at 531 (commenting on Boy Scouts of 
Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)). 
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Segregating religious institutions into sovereign constitutional spheres has 
strong historic roots.176 Prior to the disestablishment of religion in America, 
institutional religious belief and action was deemed essential to the proper 
functioning of the government by supporting the public morality and civic vir-
tue thought essential to the survival of civil authority.177 Likewise, it was 
thought that state support for, and involvement in religion was necessary for 
the flourishing of religion.178 
Following the disestablishment of religion, the state and religious institu-
tions underwent a “formal decoupling” whereby civil authorities had no further 
role in religious institutional governance and matters of faith, and religious 
institutions were to have no formal place in civil affairs.179 The restraint on 
both government and religion in the involvement in the affairs of the other was 
expected to yield benefits to both the state and religious institutions.180 De-
regulating religious institutions promised domestic peace over matters of reli-
gious doctrine and governance.181 Although disputes over theology would in-
evitably still arise, their resolution was no longer linked to taxes, voting rights, 
office-holding capacity, or other secular matters. In addition, the removal of 
state control over religious matters meant that religious institutions would be 
autonomous entities, with the liberty to rise and fall on their own merits, based 
on the appeal of the institutional faith and message.182 This removal of secular 
control from religious institutions was a welcome departure from the standard 
tendency of the state to co-opt power rather than relinquish it.183 There was a 
new awareness that government involvement with religious institutions could 
have a detrimental effect on both the religious character and mission of that 
institution.184 
Undergirding the disestablishment of religion, then, is an acknowledge-
ment of the vitality of religion to the human condition, and of the need for in-
stitutional autonomy for religious liberty—and consequently the secular 
state—to flourish. Whether this vision is true today is certainly open to de-
                                                                                                                           
 176 See generally Esbeck, supra note 128 (tracing the relationship between the church and the 
state throughout Western history). 
 177 See id. at 1412 (“Puritanism’s more personal and emotional Protestantism was intertwined 
with sympathy for greater popular governance and Parliamentary rule.”). 
 178 See id. 
 179 Id. at 1393, 1396. 
 180 Id. at 1396–98. 
 181 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 767–68 (1941); Esbeck, supra note 128, at 
1397. 
 182 Esbeck, supra note 128, at 1397–98 (“[C]hurches were free to fail, as well as succeed, in the 
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 183 Id. at 1397. 
 184 Id. at 1398; see Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference 
with Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 351 (1984). 
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bate.185 What remains constant, however, is the Court’s recognition that at least 
to some degree, in the words of James Madison, “Religion is wholly exempt 
from [the] cognizance” of the “institution[s] of Civil Society.”186 
Looking to Madison for guidance, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor empha-
sized Madison’s veto of a bill that would have incorporated the Protestant 
Episcopal Church, where Madison espoused “the essential distinction between 
civil and religious functions.”187 For the Court, interference with decisions of a 
religious institution that “affect the faith and mission” of that institution is a 
violation of that institution’s religious liberty.188 Attempting to prescribe regu-
lations that affected the internal workings of Hosanna-Tabor infringed on the 
sovereignty of that institution to make certain decisions without the oversight 
and possible infringement of the state.189 This fundamental recognition of the 
right of religious institutions to absolute protection over their internal affairs, 
without any possibility of state infringement on that institutional sphere, not 
only limits the reach of secular authorities, but completely forecloses them. 
This is the epitome of private government and the right of private ordering, 
and concrete recognition of the constitutional enshrinement of the dualism of 
religious institutions and state. 
Examining the other decisions that involve deference to religious institu-
tional sovereignty, it is possible to see this theme of private government and 
the right of private ordering permeating the Court’s jurisprudence.190 In Watson 
v. Jones, for example, the Court noted the “unquestioned” right of religious 
institutions to decide “controverted questions of faith” as well as matters of 
“ecclesiastical government.”191 Speaking to the jurisdiction of the Court to de-
cide on the question of the ownership of the church property at issue, the Court 
specified that it is a core right of religious institutions to have final decision-
making authority on questions of faith and internal governance.192 For the Wat-
                                                                                                                           
 185 Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 931; see ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMP-
BELL, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW RELIGION DIVIDES AND UNITES US 443–92 (2010); PAUL J. 
WEITHMAN, RELIGION AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 36–66 (2002); John A. Coleman, 
Public Religion and Religion in Public, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 279, 282–93 (2001). 
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JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS para. 1 
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dent James Madison)); see Wasserman, supra note 4, at 297. 
 188 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. 
 189 See id. at 706. 
 190 See infra notes 191–265 and accompanying text. Note that unlike Hosanna-Tabor, these other 
decisions do not contain a statement of an absolute constitutional right for religious associations with-
in the context of the subject area considered. See supra notes 26–46 and accompanying text. 
 191 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728–29 (1871). 
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son Court, each religious institution has its own body of constitutional and ec-
clesiastical law that relate to matters of faith and governance over which secu-
lar authorities have no jurisdiction.193 
The Court made similar statements in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of 
Russian Orthodox Church in North America, again implicitly enshrining the 
idea of religious sovereignty.194 As noted above, the Kedroff Court stated that 
religious institutions have a constitutional right to decide matters of church 
governance, faith, and doctrine without risk of state interference.195 In fact, 
across the Court’s decisions in all subject-matter categories involving churches 
is recognition that the Religion Clauses protect a sphere of institutional author-
ity for religious institutions—a sphere within which the secular courts and po-
litical branches have no adjudicatory and/or prescriptive authority.196 
A core value of the Court’s religious institutionalism, then, is the protec-
tion of group rights as a value in and of itself. The Court seems to perceive 
something special about religious groups as groups, operating independently 
from the government. In many respects, the remaining values that animate the 
Court’s religious institutionalism jurisprudence are interrelated with this foun-
dational valuing of group rights. That is, the remaining values in many respects 
facilitate the valuing of groups qua groups. 
2. Promotion of Individual Freedom 
Related to the protection of religious group rights is the Court’s ac-
ceptance that religious institutions promote or enhance the individual right of 
conscience and belief.197 In other words, religious institutions facilitate reli-
gious individuals’ exercise of their First Amendment liberties. In this way, reli-
gious institutions act as intermediaries and hold rights only for the purpose of 
promoting individual liberties and ensuring the protection of individual inter-
ests.198 
The Court has long recognized that individual conscience and the right of 
individuals to choose between religions—or no religion—are values enshrined 
                                                                                                                           
all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides 
for.”). 
 193 Id. 
 194 See 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952); supra notes 77–84 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Court’s analyses regarding congregational churches and hierarchical churches). 
 195 344 U.S. at 116. 
 196 See Wasserman, supra note 4, at 192 (“The church autonomy doctrine’s limitations on state 
authority ensure a structural balance separating church and state as competing sovereigns within 
American society, each with irreducible authority in its own ‘sphere.’”); supra notes 68–128 and ac-
companying text (providing an overview of religious institutionalism cases in the Supreme Court). 
 197 See, e.g., Bruce Bagni, supra note 48, at 1540; Laycock, Towards a General Theory, supra 
note 5, at 1373. 
 198 Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 925–26. 
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in the First Amendment.199 This voluntarist approach to individual religious 
conscience has deep historic roots, drawing support from James Madison.200 
On this view, the government may not impose a preferred way of religious life 
on the citizenry. Instead, people are free to choose their own ends for them-
selves and select the religious faith that best accords with their individual view 
of the good life.201 
This freedom of choice over individual belief appeared in its modern 
form in the 1940 Supreme Court case Cantwell v. Connecticut,202 the case that 
incorporated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.203 There the 
Court said that “[f]reedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such reli-
gious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be 
restricted by law.”204 Similar statements about choices of faith according to the 
dictates of conscience appear in the 1963 case Abington School District v. 
Schempp, where the Court recognized “the right of every person to freely 
choose his own course . . . free of any compulsion from the state.”205 More 
recently, in the 1985 Supreme Court decision in Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice John 
Paul Stevens stated that a fundamental, and unquestioned, purpose of the Reli-
gion Clauses is the value of choice as to religious faith and conscience.206 The 
principle of free religious choice is, of course, a fundamental principle of lib-
eral theory, premised on both the Lockean notion of natural rights and the 
Kantian premise of autonomy.207 Above all things, liberalism values human 
autonomy.208 
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 204 Id. at 303. 
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 207 See John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), reprinted in POLITICAL WRITINGS 
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Religious institutions fit into this vision of freedom of belief once we 
move from a thin conception of religious choice—individual choice and reli-
gious belief—to a thicker vision, that includes at its core recognition and un-
derstanding that exercise of conscience is typically a communal endeavor.209 
One of the most powerful acknowledgements of the communal aspect of reli-
gious conscience is in the brief filed for the Amish in Wisconsin v. Yoder.210 
The brief states: 
There exists no Amish religion apart from the concept of the Amish 
community. A person cannot take up the Amish religion and practice 
it individually. The community subsists spiritually upon the bounds 
of a common, lived faith, sustained by common traditions and ideas 
which have been revered by the whole community from generation 
to generation.211 
In other words, religious belief and the communal form in or through which 
religious expression occurs are inextricably linked and are ultimately insepara-
ble.212 
Law and religion scholars have recognized this intimate connection be-
tween individual religious liberty and religious institutions. One scholar notes 
that individuals exercise and express their religious beliefs within groups com-
prised of persons with similar views.213 Another scholar acknowledges that 
religious institutions play a fundamental role in defining and shaping the indi-
vidual conscience.214 For yet another commentator, religious institutions are 
“ongoing and independent entities that influence in their own right how indi-
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viduals think, express themselves, and act.”215 For these reasons, although reli-
gious institutions can in some ways be characterized as the aggregate of the 
individual member-believers, religious institutions are much more than a pure 
individualized aggregation of religious individuals.216 Instead, religious institu-
tions are prior to and independent of the individual members, more than just 
vehicles for the expression of individual religious beliefs.217 They “represent[] 
an ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere 
aggregation of individuals.”218 
It is the collective action of the individuals that create traditions that in 
turn become entrenched and ongoing.219 Religious institutions become places 
where religious conscience is not only practiced, but formed and preserved.220 
It is the institutions, represented by member-officials, that engage with the in-
dividual members on matters of faith, doctrine, worship, and other issues.221 
The principle of individual choice as to matters of conscience and belief, then, 
also includes the right to form collective associations through which those be-
liefs can be supported, nourished, questioned, and practiced. In other words, 
religious institutions are valued as independent constitutional actors because of 
the fact that they are belief-enforcing.222 
The question remains: How does the collection of individual beliefs into 
one institutional form generate an independent institutional right that is worthy 
of constitutional protection separate from the individual generative right? Even 
if we accept that religious institutions function as belief-enforcing mediums, 
how does that premise translate into institutional liberties independent from the 
original rights holder? The answer lies in the power of collective belief. 
When individuals form into a group to exercise their conscience rights 
there is general agreement on the fundamentals of the collective form that are 
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necessary to protect their individual conscience rights. The institution, then, 
becomes more than an aggregate of individual beliefs and instead morphs into 
an independent entity that protects more than the sum of its parts. The institu-
tion protects the values of the collective expression of faith. In this way, the 
institution is more than the representative of the individual, and instead it is a 
necessary element to the exercise of conscience.223 Once we accept the essen-
tial nature of expression and action of belief through the institutional form, we 
can see that the Religion Clauses presupposes a constitutionally protected 
community that itself generates religious norms.224 
Underlying Watson and its progeny is the Court’s implicit acceptance that 
religious institutions are independently valuable and worthy of special First 
Amendment protection.225 The independent belief-enforcing value of religious 
institutions is arguably one value undergirding the Court’s decisions that rec-
ognize a right of institutional private ordering.226 From Watson through Ho-
sanna-Tabor, it is possible to see the Court’s recognition of the value of reli-
gious institutions as unique groups that enable religious self-definition, belief, 
and choice. In Watson, for example, the Court held that “[t]he law knows no 
heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no 
sect.”227 Consequently, in order to ensure individual fulfillment of religious 
belief, individuals had the right to form associations in which to practice their 
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 227 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728. 
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religious beliefs.228 These religious institutions were formed, the Court said, to 
facilitate the dissemination and expression of religious doctrine.229 
The sovereignty of religious institutions, then, becomes a function of in-
dividual faith that institutions foster, nurture, and protect. Religious institution-
al autonomy, one scholar notes, is a corollary of voluntariness, where autono-
my allows for religious groups to voluntarily organize themselves around a 
religious mission without government interference.230 Once we accept that the 
institutions are independent protectors and facilitators of religious conscience 
and freedom of choice as to religious belief, then it is possible to better under-
stand the Court’s decisions denying secular authorities prescriptive and adjudi-
cative power over religious institutions where matters that could impact indi-
vidual belief are concerned. 
For the Court, the individual choice to opt into a religious institution car-
ries with it the acceptance that the institution acts in the interests of the whole. 
The Court in Watson stated that individuals who voluntarily opt into a religious 
institution also impliedly consent to the governance of that institution.231 An 
institution, in other words, is entitled to expect institutional loyalty from volun-
tary members.232 As part of the choice to express individual conscience 
through the medium of a group, the individual has accepted the collective ex-
pression of faith that the institution represents and is obliged to protect. Indi-
viduals can opt into an institution, they can engage with the institution on mat-
ters of faith, or they can opt out of the institution,233 but an individual cannot 
rely on secular authorities to challenge the collective expression of conscience 
manifested by a religious institution.234 Secular involvement would be a clear 
                                                                                                                           
 228 See id. at 728–29. 
 229 Id. at 729. 
 230 See Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then and Now, 2004 
BYU L. REV. 1593, 1606 (“[T]he autonomy of religious organizations is a corollary of the voluntary 
principle: autonomy allows religious communities to organize themselves and define their missions 
according to their own voluntary choices, without government interference.”). 
 231 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729. 
 232 Chopko & Parker, supra note 152, at 283. 
 233 On whether an individual’s right of exit from an institution is sufficient to legitimate private 
ordering, see, for example, JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 221–22 (1995); Hills, supra note 
164, at 148–53; Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance in Residential As-
sociations, Municipalities, and Indian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1140–44 
(1998) (attempting to derive a theory of private government from Rawls’ political liberalism and theo-
ry of justice). 
 234 Barkley v. Hayes, 208 F. 319, 323 (W.D. Mo. 1913), aff’d sub nom. Shepard v. Barkley, 247 
U.S. 1 (1918); see also Laycock, Towards a General Theory, supra note 5, at 1403 (“If one is ill-
treated by his church, he can leave it; if he feels bound by faith or conscience to stay in, the govern-
ment can offer him no remedy.”). As the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri noted 
in the 1913 case Barkley v. Hayes: 
He need associate himself with no religious organization if he does not wish to do so, 
and he need remain identified with one no longer than he may desire; but when he does 
2014] What Is a "Religious Institution"? 219 
violation of the fundamental premise of freedom of religious belief enshrined 
in the Religion Clauses. In this way, the sovereignty accorded religious institu-
tions is both derivative of and independent of individual freedom of con-
science.235 
3. Provision of Desirable Structures 
The third and final value animating the Court’s religious institutionalism 
jurisprudence is an understanding that religious institutions provide societal 
structures that are democratically desirable. By disavowing state power over 
certain religious-based topics, the Court is suggesting that religious institutions 
are relatively more competent than secular bodies to perform two democratic 
functions: (1) facilitation of social engagement, and (2) protection of the state 
from religious involvement with secular offices. 
Although the belief-enforcing value outlined above derived its legitimacy 
from an independent individual right, the concept of religious institutions as 
valuable democratic structures is an institutional right, separate and independ-
ent of any individual right.236 That is, this institution-based right does not rely 
on any conception of religious institutions as conscience-enhancing or belief-
enforcing for individuals. Instead, an institution-based conception of the pri-
vate ordering rights of religious institutions holds that protection for religious 
institutions is based on the democratic value of preserving religious institu-
tions.237 This view gives sovereignty to religious institutions based on their 
“likelihood of making decisions appropriate to the social sphere in which they 
operate,” thereby empowering them “to enforce a particular conception of the 
good against their members.”238 What remains is to explore the two assump-
tions that religious institutions both facilitate social engagement and protect 
the state from religious involvement. 
                                                                                                                           
unite with a church, and becomes a member of that ecclesiastical body, he voluntarily 
surrenders his individual freedom to that extent. So long as he desires to avail himself 
of such a relationship, and to enjoy the privileges and benefits flowing from that associ-
ation, he must conform to the laws by which it is governed. 
208 F. at 323. 
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a. Facilitation of Social Engagement 
Early views of the appropriate relationship between church and state as-
sumed that unity between the two spheres was essential to the survival of 
both.239 Religion was thought to have a salutary effect on civic virtue and pub-
lic morality that would facilitate democratic engagement.240 The early colonies 
subscribed to the European model of a unified church-state, although in more 
mild and abridged forms than their European counterparts.241 Over time, alt-
hough the formal relationship between church and state was one of disestab-
lishment, the new nation continued to see religion as essential to the success of 
the polity. For example, George Washington famously stated that “Religion 
and Morality are the essential pillars of Civil society,”242 and John Adams not-
ed that “We have no government armed with power capable of contending with 
human passions unbridled by morality and religion.”243 
The crucial difference between the modern, post-First Amendment under-
standing of the importance of religion for good citizenry and the European 
model is that under the latter it was assumed that material and symbolic gov-
ernment support was essential to perpetuate religiosity. The modern view re-
jects this approach, instead embracing a principle of voluntarism. Under the 
early conception of voluntarism, it became the task of religious institutions to 
ensure a virtuous citizenry, without the support or involvement of the state. 
The understanding was that a free market approach to religion would compel 
churches to higher levels of virtuosity in the quest to persuade citizens—
through the appeal of their doctrine and message—that their denomination 
should be preferred.244 In turn, it was thought that these voluntary and invigor-
ated institutions would “better perform their role . . . in seeing to the teaching 
of morals and civic virtue.”245 
                                                                                                                           
 239 Esbeck, supra note 128, at 1395; see HAROLD J. GRIMM, THE REFORMATION ERA: 1500–
1650, at 29–30 (2d ed. 1973). 
 240 Esbeck, supra note 128, at 1395. 
 241 Id. 
 242 John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 
386 (1996). 
 243 Id. 
 244 See Zoë Robinson, Rationalizing Religious Exemptions: A Legislative Process Theory of Statu-
tory Exemptions for Religion, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 133, 134–37 (2011). There is a growing 
literature on the notion of a “religious market.” See generally JOHN ANDERSON, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES: THE POLITICS OF RELIGION (2003); ROGER FINKE & RODNEY STARK, 
THE CHURCHING OF AMERICA: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN OUR RELIGIOUS ECONOMY (2005); AN-
THONY GILL, THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (2008); CHARLES HANSON, NECES-
SARY VIRTUE: THE PRAGMATIC ORIGINS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN NEW ENGLAND (1998); RATIONAL 
CHOICE THEORY AND RELIGION (Lawrence A. Young ed., 1997); Roger Finke, Religious Deregula-
tion: Origins and Consequences, 32 J. CHURCH & STATE 609 (1990); Roger Finke & Laurence R. 
Iannaccone, Supply-Side Explanations for Religious Change, 527 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 27 (1993). 
 245 Esbeck, supra note 128, at 1397. 
2014] What Is a "Religious Institution"? 221 
This early understanding of the role of religious institutions in our consti-
tutional democracy signals an understanding of these institutions as protective 
of the collective interest of a certain political culture with a specific moral 
character.246 Put another way, around the time of the framing of the First 
Amendment, religious institutions were understood to promote collective 
goods, for instance civic virtue and morality.247 Poised between the state and 
the individual, religious institutions were perceived to have a form of social 
utility that acted to generate norms and behaviors that facilitated and perpetu-
ated the continuation of the democratic polity.248 
It is true that other associational forms equally act as socializing institu-
tions that mediate between the state and the individual. The Boy Scouts, for 
example, is an expressive association with the goal of creating good citizens 
and leaders for our polity.249 But religious institutions are distinctive for two 
reasons. First, religion is especially accounted for in the First Amendment. 
Whereas freedom of association is implied from a number of First Amendment 
sources, the place of religious institutions rests securely in the text of the Reli-
gion Clauses.250 Second, as a matter of history, religious institutions were the 
primary locus for socializing activities at the time of the framing of the Consti-
tution.251 So long as originalist interpretation guides the Supreme Court’s un-
derstanding of the Religion Clauses, religious institutions will continue to be 
seen as critically different from other associational forms.252 
The valuing of religious institutions as socially desirable is another driver 
of the Court’s new religious institutionalism and another value undergirding 
the private ordering rights of religious institutions. At least as a matter of his-
toric intent, it was understood that enabling religious institutions to facilitate 
social engagement required intra-institutional space to create, cultivate, and 
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propagate their religious views, as well as govern their members in a way that 
was consistent with that faith. Religious institutions alone are capable of defin-
ing what the conception of the good life is in the eyes of their own denomina-
tional teachings. If the goal of religious private governments was at least in 
part to entrust the inculcation of civic morality to religious institutions, then it 
seems inimical that the state cannot dictate the work of those institutions in 
that respect. 
Historically, this important societal function involved at least the teach-
ings and dissemination of the religious institution about their denominational 
understanding of ultimate truth, as well as related principles of worship.253 
These activities are the central feature of religious institutions, and sovereign 
control over them ensures that the institutions could perform the task of guid-
ing morality in the image of the doctrine that they professed. If the secular au-
thorities have the capacity to become involved with religious functions in an 
attempt to skew the morals and virtues of the citizenry, religious institutions 
become compromised in their mission to act in accordance with the directives 
of their higher authority. In other words, if religious institutions are to be the 
locus of the inculcation of societal and civic virtue, any influence of the state 
in that sphere would tend to corrupt the very purpose for the independent and 
sovereign sphere. At the extreme, as the religious institution is corrupted, so 
too is the citizenry, and the fabric of the civil state unravels. Political coloring 
of religion tends to move the state to the very sectarian strife that the Religion 
Clauses were designed to prevent. 
b. Protection of State from Religious Involvement 
Religious institutions also further the intimately related democratic value 
of protecting the state from capture by one or more dominant religious 
groups.254 Symbiotic with the role of religious institutions as independent proc-
tors of public virtue was the role of religious institutions as protectors of the 
state from religious involvement. Not only did the religious voluntarism ensure 
that religious institutions worked hard to attract the citizenry to their group, but 
it also ensured that religion was segregated from secular offices.255 By carving 
out autonomous religious space, the understanding was that civil authorities 
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would also be protected from the disruptive influence of religion in govern-
ment office.256 
The idea that religion operates outside the realm of politics can be traced 
back to James Madison’s 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights and his 1785 
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.257 In the Memo-
rial, Madison stated that a just government “will be best supported by protect-
ing every citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand 
which protects his person and property.”258 This is not to say that religion was 
to have no role in the public square. On the contrary, as noted above, religion 
was thought to be crucial to a virtuous and moral civil society.259 Instead, the 
value is one that sees religion as a matter outside both the jurisdiction and the 
competence of civil government.260 The goal was to free the state and politics 
from religion, so as to free the state from the potential for abuse of its offices 
by religious groups seeking to gain an edge in the religious marketplace.261 
For these reasons, the recognition of sovereign rights of religious institu-
tions over inherently religious issues was seen to be democratic-enforcing. 
Perhaps because of the temptation of legislators to appeal to religion as a 
means of garnering votes to retain office, it was perceived that religious insti-
tutions themselves were structurally better suited to the role of protecting the 
state from both religion and itself.262 
As democratic-enhancing entities, religious institutions were understood 
to have control over matters of faith.263 This understanding partially explains 
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the Court’s hands-off approach in Watson and its progeny.264 It seems clear that 
if any office of the state were to attempt to control, direct, or resolve disputes 
that rested on theology, the state would be subjecting itself to the influence of 
that religion. Valuing religious institutions as private sovereigns ensures that 
the state is a “penultimate” institution, with a limited horizon that forswears 
any “comprehensive claim to undivided loyalty.”265 
Decisions like Hosanna-Tabor can in part be explained by this democrat-
ic-protective notion. Although Hosanna-Tabor and similar cases go beyond a 
prohibition on government making theologically based decisions on matters of 
faith and doctrine, they have as their base the same value. In order to protect 
the government from religion, arguably the government must also be insulated 
from the organizational functions of the religious institution. Meaningfully 
protecting government from the temptation of religious institutional support 
requires spherical insulation of religious organizational decisions as well. In 
other words, a robust conception of religious identity and therefore sovereignty 
is essential to protecting the secular sphere from being captured by a dominant 
religious group, voluntarily or otherwise. 
* * * 
Together, the two institutional functions of facilitation of social engage-
ment and protecting the state from religious capture can partially explain the 
Court’s recognition of a distinct First Amendment category for religious insti-
tutions. More than simply rights-protective, the conception of the values un-
derlying the recognition of private government rights for religious institutions 
assumes that religious institutions are institutions that are independently demo-
cratically desirable. Religious institutions, on this view, are uniquely compe-
tent to provide societal structures that are democracy-enhancing. 
What remains is preliminarily drawing out some tangible principles from 
these values—religious sovereignty, individual conscience, and democratically 
valuable structures—in order to articulate workable guidelines for identifying 
first-order religious institutions. 
B. From Values to Principles: Toward Workable Guidelines for Identifying 
Religious Institutions 
Drawing on the values outlined above, we can begin to compile a set of 
guidelines that courts can use to determine whether any given religious institu-
tion is a first- or second-order religious institution. Importantly, this Article 
does not attempt to definitively determine which institutions are and are not 
                                                                                                                           
 264 See supra notes 68–128 and accompanying text (providing an overview of religious institu-
tionalism cases in the Supreme Court). 
 265 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 255, at 83–84; see Thomas Berg, Religious Organizational Freedom and 
Conditions on Government Benefits, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 165, 173, 177 (2009). 
2014] What Is a "Religious Institution"? 225 
first-order religious institutions. Instead, the list of factors that organically 
originate from the underlying constitutional values should be seen as the first 
attempt in an ongoing discussion to identify first-order religious institutions. 
The ultimate goal of this Section is to identify reliable proxies and considera-
tions that will lead courts to identify those institutions that are best fulfilling 
the unique constitutional functions of the religious institution. 
The three core values outlined in the preceding Section suggest that the 
following four factors are the most significant in identifying a first-order reli-
gious institution: (1) recognition as a religious institution; (2) functions as a 
religious institution; (3) voluntariness; and (4) privacy-seeking. These four 
factors provide workable guidelines, based on a secure theoretical foundation, 
to aid courts in determining what institutions attract the constitutional mantle 
of first-order religious institution. 
1. Recognition as a Religious Institution 
Relying on third-party recognition of what a first-order religious institu-
tion looks like allows us to capture those institutions that have as their goal 
uniquely religious objectives. Thinking back to the values undergirding consti-
tutional recognition of religious institutionalism, the Court placed strong em-
phasis on the rights of groups that serve norm creating and reinforcing purpos-
es and that provide social structures within which societal subgroups can func-
tion without state oversight.266 The thought was that if these groups were to 
maintain their character as private associations, they needed space for religion 
to prosper and flourish. It makes sense, then, that a first-order religious institu-
tion is one that third parties recognize as providing a space for individuals to 
achieve uniquely religious objectives, such as faith and salvation. 
This argument has been made in the limited context of employment dis-
crimination, where the claim is that for an institution to be a religious institu-
tion, employees must be able to recognize it as such.267 On this view, a third-
party recognition rule ensures that employees can be validly held to have im-
pliedly consented to a religious institution’s authority.268 
Extrapolating to a broader context, this principle has to be right. If the 
value of first-order religious institutions is to provide groups with space to de-
velop and disseminate religious views, and individuals with the opportunity to 
develop their conscience in a manner of their choosing, the institution must be 
recognizable as religious so as to facilitate these constitutional goals. Related-
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ly, third-party recognition of institutions as first-order religious institutions 
supports the independence of first-order religious institutions to facilitate so-
cial engagement in a manner synchronous with faith-principles. Citizen recog-
nition of an institution as a locus of civil virtue buttresses any claim for recog-
nition as a first-order religious institution. 
This approach is similar to the Hosanna-Tabor Court’s approach in de-
termining whether a person is a minister for purposes of the ministerial excep-
tion.269 The Court emphasized that Cheryl Perich was considered a minister by 
the school and church, and that her role was distinct from that of other mem-
bers.270 The Court noted that Perich’s title was a “called” teacher, as opposed 
to a lay teacher, and that she was referred to as a commissioned minister.271 For 
the Court, then, Perich was a minister because the Church labeled her as one, 
and she was recognized as one by members of the church and school commu-
nity. 
Practically speaking, measuring whether an institution is religious via 
third-party recognition necessarily involves some consideration of the func-
tional aspects of the institution in question. Indeed, the Court admitted as much 
in its consideration of Perich’s ministerial classification when it analyzed her 
job functions.272 Whether a third party will recognize that the institution they 
are engaging with is religious will involve an assessment of sub-factors includ-
ing whether the institution publicized a religious mission, whether the institu-
tional functions were religiously oriented or at least religiously based, and 
whether involvement with the institution requires a religious commitment on 
the part of the individual. In other words, courts will need to look to the extent 
to which religious characteristics are incorporated into the life of the institu-
tion, such that institutional entrants would recognize the organization as dis-
tinctly religious.273 
In this respect, we can draw on the approach other courts have taken to 
defining religious institutions in the statutory context, in particular the Fourth 
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Circuit’s approach to defining a religious institution in the context of Title VII. 
As mentioned above, the Fourth Circuit has specified that in any determination 
of whether an institution falls within the scope of Title VII’s protections, it is 
critical that religion is part of the day-to-day life of the institution, and that the 
“entity’s mission is marked by clear or obvious religious characteristics.”274 
Sub-factors including whether the governing documents of the institution ref-
erence a religious mission, whether board members are required to be affiliated 
with any religion, and whether any house of worship retains any jurisdiction 
over the entity are central in making this determination.275 
2. Functions as a Religious Institution 
Intimately related with the first factor—third-party recognition—is the 
notion that an institution should have as a core value at least the capacity to 
promote individual conscience on matters of faith. If a feature of first-order 
religious institutions is at least partially to generate norms among a collective 
group of citizens in order to facilitate individual belief, as well as provide 
democratic structures to facilitate social engagement, it seems rational to con-
clude that the community whom the religious institution supports is somehow 
jurisgenerative.276 This suggests that the community must be organized around 
some religious mission, with an associated guiding doctrine, as well as internal 
governance structures that have as their goal the protection of the institution 
for the purposes of collective belief-enforcement and the facilitation of indi-
vidual belief.277 What distinguishes this factor from the first is that not only 
does the institution need to be perceived as a religious institution, but it needs 
to also fulfill its role as a religious institution. 
This inquiry is again similar to that which the Court undertook in Hosan-
na-Tabor when it determined whether Perich was a “minister” for purposes of 
the ministerial exception.278 In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court specified that Perich 
would be considered a “minister” if she actually functioned as a minister.279 
The Court noted that, in her capacity as a called teacher, Perich led devotional 
exercises, worship services, daily prayers, and also taught scriptures.280 By 
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engaging in these duties, the Court held, Perich epitomized what it meant to be 
a minister.281 
As with the search for a “minister,” ascertaining which institutions are 
first-order religious institutions involves identifying which institutions are ful-
filling a particular constitutional function. Distinguishing a first-order religious 
institution from a second-order religious institution, therefore, requires asking 
whether the institution is carrying on the unique role of a religious institution. 
And while the focus in the first factor is whether a third party perceives the 
institution as performing special constitutional functions, the focus in this sec-
ond factor is whether those functions are truly being fulfilled. If we are search-
ing for institutions that are constitutionally unique, we need to focus on those 
intra-institutional functions that identify the institutions that are worthy of spe-
cial constitutional protection and find those institutions that are actually satis-
fying the role. 
Finally, it is important to note that in Hosanna-Tabor, the Court held that 
the fact that Perich spent relatively minimal time on ministerial duties was not 
of central importance for identification as a minister.282 The Court noted that 
time spent on these duties was relevant; however, time was not to “be consid-
ered in isolation, without regard to the nature of the religious functions per-
formed and . . . other considerations.”283 This indicates that institutions beyond 
churches and other houses of worship can be classified as a first-order reli-
gious institution, but keeps the focus on the fact that any group claiming spe-
cial constitutional protection still must act to fulfill the constitutional values 
undergirding the recognition of constitutional religious institutionalism. 
3. Voluntariness 
The third factor focuses on the value of individual liberty promotion and 
emphasizes that to be considered a first-order religious institution membership 
in the institution in question must be voluntary. In this context, voluntariness 
must at least mean that individuals know that they are entering into a religious 
institution and that they can exit at will.284 In other words, an individual must 
have the opportunity to determine that a religious institution best serves their 
conscience and consciously opt-in to that institution. Equally, if an individual 
determines that the institutional arrangements, both substantive and structural, 
do not best serve their individual conscience needs, the individual must have 
the opportunity and option to exit that institution. 
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Voluntariness, determined by entry and exit capacity, is essential to sup-
port the value of individual freedom. The freedom to believe and to act upon 
those beliefs is only possible if there is truly individual freedom to accept any 
institution’s positions and reject them. An institution that does not provide an 
individual with the freedom to choose to enter or exit because of the dogma 
promoted by the institution necessarily violates individual freedom and con-
science. This is especially so given the value of group rights. So long as the 
Constitution values and promotes the choice of the group in its decisions about 
belief, dogma, and action in pursuance of those beliefs, then the individual will 
be subject to the constraints of the institution.285 When the Constitution values 
group autonomy and sanctions religious sovereignty, leaving governance of 
group members to the group, individuals must have the independent choice of 
whether to submit to that sovereignty, both as an initial matter and in an ongo-
ing sense.286 
4. Privacy-Seeking 
Finally, the institution should seek disengagement from the formal arms 
of the state, rather than engagement with the secular authorities.287 If we value 
religious institutions as establishments that are peculiarly suited to protecting 
the state from religious involvement, first-order religious institutions should 
seek separation and disentanglement from the formal mechanisms of the state. 
The above Section notes that undergirding the Court’s religious institu-
tionalism jurisprudence is the valuing of first-order religious institutions as 
providing desirable societal structures. First-order religious institutions, then, 
both facilitate social engagement and protect the state from religion. In order to 
fulfill this role, at its core a first-order institution should seek privacy from, 
rather than involvement with, the formal arms of the civil government. 
* * * 
There is no doubt that searching for a workable framework to identify 
first-order religious institutions is fraught with difficulty. Even at first glance it 
is clear that this framework will capture a very limited group of institutions 
beyond formal houses of worship. That is, the framework is narrow, and per-
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mits only a limited type of religious institution to be characterized as a first-
order religious institution. Although many will see this as a flaw in the frame-
work, this narrowness is ultimately beneficial because unless some distin-
guishable criteria are agreed upon, and some institutions are excluded from the 
categorical protections, religious institutionalism will eventually melt into the 
general Religion Clauses, leaving the new religious institutional category void 
of any content. Thus, a narrower definition of a first-order religious institution 
can be both constitutionally acceptable and functionally superior. 
C. Embracing a Narrower Definition of “Religious Institution” 
A narrow definition of constitutional religious institutions is ultimately 
beneficial. Although the impulse to include a broader type of religious institu-
tion in the First Amendment category comes from a place of valuing equality 
and neutrality, this overprotective impulse is a poor fit with constitutional reli-
gious institutionalism. The consequences of institutional overinclusiveness has 
the potential to seriously weaken the institutional protection for core religious 
institutions. This Section discusses the problems with an over-inclusive defini-
tion, as well as the reasons why we might be comfortable accepting a narrower 
institutional definition for the purposes of constitutional religious institutional-
ism. 
1. Less Is More 
 Over-inclusion of institutions in the constitutional category will result in 
the disappearance of protections for first-order religious institutions. It does so 
by creating a “feedback loop” that erases distinctions between protections ac-
corded to first-order religious institutions and the protections contained in the 
generally applicable Religion Clauses. Ironically, the more broadly we define 
first-order religious institutions, the less substantive protection those first-order 
religious institutions will likely receive. 
 Philip Hamburger notes this phenomenon in his study on the definition of 
religion under the Free Exercise Clause.288 There, Hamburger specifies that 
“an enlarged definition of any right may invite limitations on the circumstanc-
es in which it is available . . . and its effects are apt to be felt with particular 
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regret.”289 Hamburger notes the dangers inherent in an overinclusive right, 
claiming that “at some point, as the definition of a right is enlarged, there are 
likely to be reasons for qualifying access [to that right].”290 Hamburger ob-
serves that in the context of the Free Exercise Clause, as the concept of “free 
exercise” is enlarged, access to that right concurrently diminished.291 Vincent 
Blasi notes in the context of the Speech Clause, that when rights are interpreted 
broadly, they inevitably become politically vulnerable.292 Sonja West claims that 
any broad definition of “the Press” will result in Press Clause redundancy.293 
Any over inclusion in the religious institutions category will inevitably 
have a similar effect. The outcome will be that those institutions that clearly 
fall within the constitutional definition of a religious institution (e.g., churches) 
will suffer from constitutional underprotection. In other words, fueled by the 
desire to create a definition of religious institutions that protects institutions at 
the periphery as well as the core, those borderline institutions that seek inclu-
sion in the institutional category will ultimately harm the interests of the core 
religious institutions. The reason for this is that once every faith-affiliated or 
faith-based institution is declared a first-order religious institution, the initial 
purpose for carving out religious institutions as something unique under the 
Religion Clauses becomes lost. Once this occurs, the purposes for the special 
recognition of religious institutions under the First Amendment become blurred 
and the institutional protections verge towards constitutional redundancy. 
In addition, a broad definition raises distinct pragmatic problems. It is un-
tenable that a wide range of institutions could claim absolute sovereignty from 
the prescriptive and adjudicative auspices of the state.294 Rationally, we cannot 
let virtually everyone out of the sovereign jurisdiction of the state. If judges are 
forced to choose between letting everyone in a broad institutional category 
have sovereign rights or no one, they will inevitably choose no one.295 
2. The Availability of “Fallback Protections” 
Limiting the institutions that can access the special protections for first-
order religious institutions is not as constitutionally problematic as limiting the 
type of religious claims that can access the generally applicable Religion 
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Clauses.296 Whereas limiting the potential plaintiffs under the Religion Clauses 
by limiting the definition of “religion” results in no constitutional protection, 
limiting the institutions that can claim to be first-order religious institutions 
does not have the same outcome.297 Instead, if an institution based on religious 
premises is not considered a first-order religious institution, that institution still 
has extensive rights under the Religion Clauses.298 
Undergirding the Religion Clauses is an overinclusiveness as to what 
claims are in fact religious. This overinclusiveness stems from both the desire 
to include the maximum number of commitments claimed to be based on indi-
vidual conscience, as well as the judicial desire to not engage with the question 
of defining religion for constitutional purposes. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
never adopted a constitutional definition of religion; nevertheless, its cases that 
touch on the issue suggest a broad conception that includes a vast array of be-
liefs.299 For example, in the 1989 Supreme Court case Frazee v. Illinois De-
partment of Employment, the plaintiff was denied unemployment insurance for 
refusing to work on Sunday because of his non-institutional Christian belief 
that Sunday is the “Lord’s Day.”300 Although limiting the application of the 
Religion Clauses to “religious” beliefs (and excluding “purely secular” based 
beliefs), the Court held that Frazee fell within the scope of the Clauses, sug-
gesting that for a claim to be religious, it was sufficient that a belief in some 
higher power be personally held.301 
The Court has gone even further in the statutory context. In the often cited 
Supreme Court cases of Welsh v. United States and United States v. Seeger, 
decided in 1970 and 1965, respectively, the Court went so far as to state that 
whether a belief was in fact religious was a question best answered by asking 
whether the claimant’s belief was “in his own scheme of things, religious.”302 
The Court specified that the notion of a god or gods was not determinative, 
instead, sincere and meaningful belief, unrestricted by traditional or parochial 
concepts of religion, was what was determinative of the religious character of a 
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claimed belief.303 Similarly broad definitions of religion prevail in the lower 
federal courts. For example, in the 2000 U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit case Kalka v. Hawk,304 the court held that humanism, “a philosophy 
that advocates happiness in this life rather than hope for a heaven in an after-
life,” was religious for First Amendment purposes.305 
This broad definition means that no claim that has religious faith as its 
base will be left without constitutional recourse. No concern exists, then, that a 
limited definition of first-order religious institutions will exclude some groups 
from the auspices of the Religion Clauses. These religious-based claims, val-
ued as they are by their special recognition in the First Amendment, will still 
receive the fallback protection of the neutrally applicable doctrine under the 
Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause—the very same protections 
that religious individuals are entitled to under the Clauses. 
This makes the religious institutions category unique. We strive for an 
overinclusive definition of religion so that a belief that a person holds as reli-
gious is not inadvertently excluded because religious beliefs are considered 
uniquely valuable in our constitutional scheme. The negative effects of exclud-
ing a belief claimed to be religious is the devaluing of a person’s faith, as well 
as potential cultural favoritism toward traditional and familiar belief structures. 
These costs are large, and overinclusion seems necessary. Nevertheless, the 
potential costs of excluding a religious institution from the institutional catego-
ry of the Religion Clauses are not so high, and rather than being denied the 
protection for and from religion guaranteed by the Religion Clauses entirely, 
an excluded institution will still be free to claim protection under the generally 
and neutrally applicable doctrine. These fallback protections, then, lessen any 
impact on religious institutions that do not fall within the limited definition 
proposed in the above Section, and provides protection against potential errors 
in line-drawing. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s recognition of a special category of protection for a 
distinct constitutional actor—religious institutions—results in a constitutional 
regime that raises significant interpretive issues. The religious institutions cat-
egory recognizes an absolute right of private ordering for those institutions that 
validly claim to fall within the auspices of its protection. In the face of this 
new First Amendment protection, the most urgent interpretive question facing 
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the courts is what religious institutions are first-order religious institutions. The 
recognition of the distinct constitutional right for religious institutions neces-
sarily raises this question of who will (and conversely who will not) be able to 
rely upon them. 
This is a very real and pressing interpretive question and this Article has 
sought to elucidate a preliminary framework for identifying first-order reli-
gious institutions. Drawn from the values animating the Court’s religious insti-
tutionalism jurisprudence, the framework embraces the principle of exception-
alism. The Court has made it clear that religious institutions play a specific and 
important role in our constitutional democracy—a role that not every institu-
tion claiming to be religious fulfills. Designating all institutions with some re-
ligious component as first-order religious institutions does not further the con-
stitutional goals of religious institutionalism. 
The values and related framework proposed in this Article result in a nar-
row category of protected institutions under the Religion Clauses. It is argua-
bly necessary to reject overprotection in the context of religious institutions in 
order to justify the special recognition of religious institutions over and above 
the general Religion Clauses protections and to secure the rights of those pro-
tected groups. The fallback protections of the generally applicable Religion 
Clause doctrine, meanwhile, ensure that all religious claims are afforded con-
stitutional protection, even if the activity is exogenous to the institutional set-
ting. 
The Court has interpreted the Religion Clauses to give religious institu-
tions explicit protection. It has done so because it considers that the Constitu-
tion has assigned an important and exceptional role to religious institutions. In 
light of this, it is important that we embrace religious institutional exceptional-
ism and provide guidance on the unique and important interpretive issues faced 
in implementing this religious institutions category. 
